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NOTES
CONFESSION CORROBORATION IN NEW YORK:
A REPLACEMENT FOR THE CORPUS
DELICTI RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing rule in almost all American jurisdictions that a
defendant may not be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of a confession.I
The foundation for this rule lies historically in the convergence of three policy
factors: "first, the shock which resulted from those rare but widely reported
cases in which the 'victim' returned alive after his supposed murderer had
been convicted... ; and secondly, the general distrust of extrajudicial confes-
sions stemming from the possibilities that a confession may have been errone-
ously reported or construed .... involuntarily made .... mistaken as to law
or fact, or falsely volunteered by an insane or mentally disturbed individual
•..."2 and, thirdly, "the realization that sound law enforcement requires police
investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused. ' 3
The New York version of the confession corroboration rule, which is
similar to the rule followed by a majority of jurisdictions, provides: "A person
may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or
admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has
been committed."4 This brief statute and its predecessor have spawned a
1. See generally C. McCormick, Evidence § 158 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 7 J. Vigmore,
Evidence §§ 2070-75 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's
Confession, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Proof of the Corpus Delictil.
The confession corroboration requirement is often called the "corpus delicti rule" and has been
referred to as such in the title of this Note for ease of reference. However, the term "corpus delicti
rule" has also been used to refer to a rule of evidence in the law of homicide which has no relation
to confession corroboration. See notes 25 & 43 infra. Also, there are other methods of confession
corroboration which do not follow the "corpus delicti" format. To avoid confusion, the term
"corpus delicti version" will be used throughout this Note to refer to that standard of corrobora-
tion that incorporates the "corpus delicti" concept.
2. People v. Murray, 40 N.Y.2d 327, 331-32, 353 N.E.2d 605, 608, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691,
694-95 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977) (citations and footnotes omitted).
3. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
4. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney 1971). The recent Criminal Procedure Law, ch.
996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 3117 (effective 1971), completely revised the old Code of Criminal
Procedure, ch. 442, 1881 N.Y. Laws 601. As to confession corroboration, only minimal changes
were made in the old rule, which had stated that a defendant's confession "is not sufficient to
warrant his conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed." Id.
§ 395; see Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney 1971). The
differences between the old and new rules are discussed in notes 52 & 80 infra. Except where such
differences are specifically discussed, all references to the New York rule or the current rule
embrace both versions.
This Note deals solely with corroboration of statements of the defendant. New York law also
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rather long and complex decisional history. The New York Court of Appeals
has promulgated several rules of construction, often strained or logically
inconsistent, directed at answering the following questions: (1) Which offense
must be corroborated? (2) Which elements of the offense must the additional
proof corroborate? (3) How much corroboration is required to satisfy the
demands of the rule?5 In People v. Murray,6 a case which reflects the
confusion engendered by the New York rule, the court of appeals failed to
reach a majority opinion on the issue of whether a conviction for felony
murder can stand when there is no proof, besides the defendant's confession,
of the underlying felony. The Murray opinions, 7 and indeed the entire line of
cases on which they rely, indicate a need for a reassessment of the current
rule, and perhaps for legislative revision of the rule.8
This Note will attempt such a reassessment. First, the history and policy of
corroboration and its relationship to other confession doctrines will be dis-
cussed. 9 Then the two major formulations of the corroboration rule in Amer-
ican criminal law will be examined: the corpus delicti version, 10 followed in
New York and the majority of states, and the trustworthiness version,"
followed in the federal courts and in an increasing number of states. Next, the
decisional history interpreting the current New York rule will be analyzed,
culminating in the conclusion that the rule is outmoded, vague, and unwork-
able. 12 The final section of this Note reviews other confession doctrines
requires corroboration of the victim's testimony where certain crimes are charged, N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 115.15 (criminal facilitation), 130.16 (certain sex offenses), 165.65 (criminal possession of
stolen property), 210.50 (perjury and related offenses), 230.15 (promoting prostitution), 253.30
(adultery and incest), 260.11 (endangering the welfare of a child) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1977-1978). Corroboration is also required where a conviction is based on unsworn testimony of a
child less than 12 years old, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.20(3) (McKinney 1971 & Cum. Supp.
1977-1978), or on accomplice testimony, id. § 60.22. In the 1970 Criminal Procedure Law
recodification, the legislature retained the latter provision despite recommendations that the
federal accomplice rule be substituted. Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
60.22 (McKinney 1971). No such suggestion was made, or probably even considered, regarding
the confession corroboration rule.
5. See pt. III infra.
6. 40 N.Y.2d 327, 353 N.E.2d 605, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948
(1977).
7. Id. at 329-35, 353 N.E.2d at 606-11, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 693-97 (Gabrielli, J.); id. at
335, 353 N.E.2d at 611, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J., concurring); id. at 335-45,
353 N.E.2d at 611-17, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 697-703 (Jasen, J., dissenting). See notes 158-75 itfra and
accompanying text for a complete discussion.
8. See Bellacosa, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50, at
145 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
9. See pt. II(A) infra.
10. See pt. II(B) infra.
11. See pt. H1(C) infra.
12. See pt. III infra.
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currently in force'3 and suggests a statutory replacement for the current
rule. 14
II. HISTORY AND POLICY OF CONFESSION CORROBORATION
A. Rationale of the Rule
The requirement of corroboration when a conviction is based upon an
extrajudicial confession is one of the oldest confession doctrines.15 In New
York, one of the first American jurisdictions to adopt the requirement,16 the
avowed purpose of corroboration is to avert the danger that a person may
confess to an offense when no such offense has in fact been committed by
anyone.' 7 In other words, the rule seeks to prevent convictions based on a
confession to a nonexistent, rather than an actual, crime.' 8 Three major
policies can be distinguished as supporting the corroboration requirement.
First, the impact of a confession may be so great upon the jury that extreme
care must be taken to insure its reliability. ' 9 There are numerous reasons why
a confession may be untrue, either in whole or in part. °20 Although other rules
of evidence exclude unreliable testimony,2 ' the corroboration requirement
13. See pt. IV(A) infra.
14. See pt. IV(B) infra.
15. For historical development, see 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, §§ 2070-71; Proof of the
Corpus Delicti, supra note 1, at 638-42; Comment, California's Corpus Delicti Rule: The Case for
Review and Clarification, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1055, 1058-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
California's Corpus Delicti Rule].
16. The rule was adopted as common law in 1836. See notes 92-106 infra and accompanying
text.
17. See, e.g., People v. Reade, 13 N.Y.2d 42, 45, 191 N.E.2d 891, 892, 241 N.Y.S.2d 829,
831 (1963).
18. People v. Rooks, 40 Misc. 2d 359, 368, 243 N.Y.S.2d 301, 311 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The
problem of confessions to actual crimes by persons not guilty of them is not an objective of the
New York corroboration requirement. Justice Sobel comments that such confessions are more
frequent than those covered by the New York rule. Id. Although the corpus delicti version of
corroboration, the New York rule, is not directed at preventing a conviction based on such an
unreliable confession, other versions of corroboration, including the version proposed herein,
would prevent such a conviction.
19. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 954-55 (1966) (here-
inafter cited as Developments].
20. See Proof of the Corpus Delicti, supra note 1 at 642-45. Unreliable statements may be
induced by physical or psychological coercion, or by improper suggestion or deceptive police
practices. In addition, a misunderstanding of the law may lead to a false confession, such as where
the accused "creates" facts for the purposes of exculpating himself, and it is those facts which are
used in his conviction. A statment may report conclusions or opinions which were not facts within
the personal knowledge of the accused, yet can be used as evidence against him at trial. Finally,
mental disease or defect, intoxication, hallucinations, or other causes, may influence the content of
the statement so as to make it unreliable. Exculpatory statements, i.e., those made by the accused
in an effort to excuse or clear himself, "are often made under conditions involving strong pressures
for unreliability." C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 145, at 312.
21. For example, the basis of the voluntariness doctrine, see note 27 infra, was the unreliabil-
ity of confessions. Also, general doctrines excluding testimony by incompetent witnesses lead to
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provides an additional safeguard in situations where a criminal prosecution
hinges on the extrajudicial words of the accused. 22 It must be noted, however,
that many authorities consider confessions highly reliable. 23 In practice, the
circumstances of the case will dictate the extent to which the confession
appears reliable, and the corroboration rule provides a formalized vehicle for
adjudging the reliability of certain facts proved through the confession.
A second rationale for the rule is the prevention of the kind of embarrass-
ment that resulted in cases where the "murdered" victim returned alive after
his supposed murderer's conviction. 24 If the state were required to produce
corroborative proof of death, in theory the possibility of such shocking events
would be greatly reduced, or eliminated. However, this rationale has as its
roots a general distrust of circumstantial evidence, and is therefore not strictly
applicable to confessions.2 5 A third objective of the corroboration rule is to
insure that the police engage in non-coercive and extensive investigative work
and that the prosecution present the best and most thorough case possible.
Simply put, if the prosecution could show that the crime took place solely by
exclusion of unreliable confessions. As to the relationship to the hearsay doctrine and its excep-
tions, as well as other aspects of the theory of admissibility of confessions, see generally C.
McCormick, supra note 1, § 145; 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 816.
22. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954); C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 158, at
349.
23. See, e.g., 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 820(b),(c). Essentially, if a confession is truly
voluntary, that is, the product of a free intellect and rational choice, it certainly has a higher
degree of reliability than most other extrajudicial statements, since rational people do not confess
to crimes of which they know they are innocent. The voluntariness doctrine, discussed in note 27
infra, thus raises the level of reliability of admissible confessions by excluding those that are not
voluntary. Massachusetts, the only state which does not recognize the corroboration requirement,
points to the voluntariness safeguards as sufficient protection against unreliability. Common-
wealth v. Killion, 194 Mass. 153, 155, 80 N.E. 222, 223 (1907).
24. See Proof of the Corpus Delicti, supra note 1, at 643-44. This rationale will be referred to
as the "reappearing victim" rationale.
25. A great deal of confusion has been generated by the use of the concept of corpus delicti in
two separate doctrines, one the confession corroboration rule and the other an evidentiary rule
historically associated with the law of homicide. The reappearing victim rationale was the entire
basis of the latter rule, which required that proof of death or criminal agency must be direct, that
is, through real evidence or eyewitness testimony. 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2081. This rule
insured that a homicide conviction could not be based solely on circumstantial evidence, thus
strengthening the probability that the victim was indeed dead. Note that a confession Is direct
eyewitness testimony, not circumstantial evidence, and thus fulfills without corroboration the
corpus delicti homicide rule. If the accused confesses that he shot the victim and threw him
overboard at sea, the homicide rule is satisfied, but, absent corroboration, the confession corrob-
oration rule is not. Thus, the confession corroboration rule must be heavily grounded in the
difference between a confession and other eyewitness testimony, differences such as greater
unreliability or possible involuntariness, not in the reappearing victim rationale. Wigmore sup-
ports this conclusion. Id. § 2070, at 393-94 n.3. Difficulties arise where the case law in a
jurisdiction following the corpus delicti corroboration rule borrows case law interpretations of
corpus delicti used for the homicide rule. The result is not necessarily appropriate to the rationale
underlying confession corroboration. See note 43 infra.
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putting a defendant's extrajudicial confession before a jury, there would be
too great a likelihood that over-reliance on confessions would result. 26
This last rationale, together with the problem of unreliability, has also
served as the justification for the common law "voluntariness" doctrine"7 and
the federal constitutional constraints, particularly as implemented in the
Miranda doctrine.2s In fact, the corroboration rule has been called a "first
26. See notes 97-99 infra and accompanying text.
27. See generally McCormick, supra note 1, § 147; Developments, supra note 19, at 954-61.
Based on the premise that a confession made under a threat or promise of benefit is likely to be
false, the voluntariness doctrine renders it inadmissible. See 3 J. Vigmore, supra note 1, §
822 n.1. Until recently, most American jurisdictions interpreted this rule rather strictly. For
example, they required that the promise of benefit must be offered by a person in authority and
must be related to the criminal charge. See Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and
the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q. 275, 283. In New York, a quirk in the
development of the law produced the highly stringent requirement that the only promise of
benefit rendering a confession inadmissible would be one made by the district attorney not to
prosecute. The first part of § 395 of the 1881 Code of Criminal Procedure, ch.442, § 395, 1881
N.Y. Laws, was enacted to make confessions admissible in response to a case which had held a
confession under oath before a coroner's inquest inadmissible at the later criminal trial of the
confessor. People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 220, 8 N.E. 496, 499-500 (1886). Section 395
declared the confession admissible "unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats,
or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that [the defendant) shall not be
prosecuted." The courts interpreted this literally to limit the voluntariness doctrine to the precise
circumstances described in the statute. Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
60.45, at 261 (McKinney 1971). Under such conditions, it is probable that in New York many
convictions were obtained through the use of unreliable confessions.
28. The voluntariness doctrine expanded as the United States Supreme Court began to review
state criminal decisions based on coerced confessions and overturned them as violative of due
process. E.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936). Restraint of coercive police practices became an equal, if not more important goal, than
reliability. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see Kamisar. What Is an "Inoluntary"
Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 753-59 (1963). The Court developed the "totality of the circumstances" test
for voluntariness, asking whether "the confession [is] the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker?" Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). How-
ever, the state courts were slow to adopt this test, and the Supreme Court soon found that the due
process review of state criminal cases, requiring careful weighing of facts and circumstances, was
too cumbersome. Dix, supra note 27, at 306-08. In 1964, the Court attempted to short-circuit this
problem by requiring, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the automatic exclusion of
statements obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. In the same
term, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was held applicable to the states.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Two years later, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
was decided. By establishing procedural safeguards in the form of warnings detailing defendant's
rights to be given to him prior to "custodial interrogation," the Court hoped to objectify the
notion of voluntariness. Id. at 478-79. If the defendant were aware of his rights, then his
confession would be a product of'free choice. One difficulty, however, is that a defendant who
makes a statement after being apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel is not
necessarily making a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. This raises many of the
voluntariness issues once again. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 154(d). Another
difficulty with Miranda is that its applicability depends on the changing definitions of "custodial
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cousin" of the voluntariness doctrine, since it is based upon the same policy
objectives. 29 Thus, the importance of the corroboration rule has varied in
accordance with the viability of the voluntariness doctrine and its constitu-
tional counterparts. As the other doctrines have become more effective in
excluding confessions from evidence, the need for corroboration has dwin-
dled.
Whereas the other doctrines have constitutional underpinnings, the corrob-
oration requirement has never attained that stature, 30 and therefore might be
considered relatively expendable. 31 Recently, several commentators have
called for the elimination of the corroboration rule, 32 particularly in light of
the increased protection guaranteed to defendants under Miranda and similar
cases. 33 However, a principle of two centuries' duration which remains alive
though somewhat inactive in the federal courts and forty-nine states, should
be carefully scrutinized before it is entirely abolished.
Since the corroboration requirement seeks to achieve its objectives by
demanding additional evidence, in most jurisdictions the requirement is not
implemented as an "exclusionary rule," as are, for example, the voluntariness
doctrine and the Miranda doctrine, but as an added requirement of eviden-
interrogation," which was originally set forth as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have
eroded the scope of Miranda by limiting the circumstances under which custodial interrogation
will be found. See 45 Fordhan L. Rev. 1222 (1977). The effectiveness of Miranda in controlling
deceptive police practices, protecting defendants' fifth amendment rights, and objectifying the
voluntariness doctrine is the subject of continuing debate. For discussion of the impact of
Miranda, see, e.g., ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 101-49 (Study Draft No. 1,
1968); 0. Stephens, The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt 168-79 (1973). That the
doctrine is inadequate to protect defendant's rights in many circumstances is argued in Dix, supra
note 27, at 310-38. For a general discussion of Miranda and its impact, see generally Y. Kamisar,
W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 568-96 (4th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1977).
29. Margolis, Corpus Delicti: State of the Disunion, 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 44, 46 (1968).
30. See Aschmeller v. South Dakota, 534 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant sought federal
habeas corpus review of state conviction of felony murder, claiming that lack of corroboration of
underlying felony violated constitutional rights; review denied on ground that corroboration not a
constitutional requirement).
3 1. As an example of expendability, the corroboration rule was almost eliminated by accident
in California's revision of its rules of evidence. See California's Corpus Delicti Rule, supra note
15, at 1055-57.
32. E.g., Developments, supra note 19, at 1084; California's Corpus Delicti Rule, supra note
15, at 1092. Attacks on the rule are not, however, strictly recent events. Wigmore was less than
pleased with it. See note 62 infra. Judge Learned Hand, in a landmark federal case, felt
constrained in following the rule to remark that while he doubted "the rule has in fact any
substantial necessity in justice . . . ," he did "not feel at liberty to disregard a principle so
commonly accepted." Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1918).
33. Some jurisdictions have weakened their corroboration requirements, pointing to the
newer doctrines as sufficiently protective of a defendant's rights. See, e.g., State v. Yoshida, 44
Haw. 352, 354 P.2d 986 (1960); Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832, 836-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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tiary sufficiency needed to get to the jury.34 The two major versions of the
rule differ as to the type of corroborative evidence which best serves its
rationales. The corpus delicti version requires that the corroborative evidence
tend to show the commission of the crime; the trustworthiness version re-
quires that the corroborative evidence tend to show the truthfulness of the
confession. 35 Clearly, there can be a great deal of overlap, since facts showing
that the crime took place will tend to corroborate the truthfulness of the
confession. However, some facts may tend to establish the trustworthiness of
the confession, yet be wholly collateral to the crime, 36 and fail to meet the
corpus delicti standard. Thus, the corpus delicti version is generally consid-
ered the stricter rule. 3" In reality, it is often not stricter, and may in some
instances be considered weaker.
3 8
B. The Corpus Delicti Version
The corpus delicti version of corroboration requires that the corroborative
evidence tend to prove the corpus delicti, the "body of the crime." To
understand the functioning of the corroboration rule, it is necessary to under-
stand this underlying concept. In proving the commission of a crime, the
prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the basic injury or
result occurred; (2) such injury was the result of criminal rather than natural
34. Although in some jurisdictions the sufficiency of corroboration may be left to the jury, the
better rule is that the decision be left to the trial judge, since the nature of the corroboration
requirement is technical and requires reasoning similar to that involved in the consideration of
preliminary questions of fact where admissibility is at issue. One of the purposes of corroboration
is to enable the judge to dismiss the charge in the face of a confession to which the jury may give
too much weight, rather than ask the jury to ignore a convincing piece of evidence and apply a
technical and little understood rule. See Comment, Pennsylvania's Corpus Delicti Rule in
Criminal Confession Cases, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 297, 309-12 (1972-73). But cf. People v. Cuozzo, 292
N.Y. 85, 95, 54 N.E.2d 20, 25-26 (1944) (instruction to jury that it could not convict solely on the
basis of a confession without corroboration). The status of the operation of the rule in New York
in this respect appears to be unclear, especially after the Murray case, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 158-75 infra.
35. "Corroborative evidence" is evidence "supplementary to that already given and tending to
strengthen or confirm it." Black's Law Dictionary 414 (4th ed. 1968). This definition applies only
to the trustworthiness version; corpus delicti corroboration is not really "corroboration" in the
sense of confirming other evidence. The New York rule appears to avoid this semantic difficulty
by its use of the term "additional proof." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney 1971).
36. See note 72 infra for an example.
37. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2071, at 397.
38. By requiring only a minimal weight of evidence and using other rules of construction
some jurisdictions have made the corpus delicti version quite weak. See notes 53-71 infra and
accompanying text. Even the three judges who joined the Murray dissenting opinion, which
favored a strong rule, had to admit "the confession corroboration requirement is one of the
weakest in our law." 40 N.Y.2d 327, 339, 353 N.E.2d 605, 613, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691, 699 (1976),
(Jasen, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court felt that
the protection of the trustworthiness version was broader. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 57, IS2
A.2d 50, 60 (1959); see notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text.
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or accidental cause; and (3) defendant was the criminal agent.3 9 Generally,
the corpus delicti is defined as the first two of these elements. 40 The identifica-
tion of the defendant, the third element, has only rarely been considered to be
part of the corpus delicti, and may usually be proved solely through the
defendant's confession. 4 1 Although the corpus delicti concept normally isolates
proof of the identity of the defendant from the other elements of the crime,
there is no requirement that this proof of identity be independent from the
proof that the crime was committed. All elements may thus rest on the same
foundation of circumstantial evidence, and evidence tending to establish the
corpus delicti may often be intertwined with evidence tending to establish
defendant's identity.4 2 Viewed in this fashion, the barrier interposed by the
corpus delicti concept is often artificial. With the exception of its use in
confession corroboration, the concept of corpus delicti is rarely used in mod-
ern criminal law.
4 3
39. 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2072, at 401.
40. Id. at 401-02. Note that Wigmore would define corpus delicti "in its orthodox sense to
signify merely the first of these elements, namely, the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained."
Id. at 401 (footnote omitted). He appears to rely heavily in this regard on the "reappearing
victim" rationale; that is, so long as the injury is shown, the protection of the rule is no longer
required. However, in almost all jurisdictions, including New York, the term "corpus delicti"
includes both elements. People v. Bennett 49 N.Y. 137, 143 (1872).
41. To include the identity of the defendant would make the corpus delicti synonymous with
the crime itself. Wigmore calls such an inclusion "absurd." 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2072, at
402. Few jurisdictions include identity in the definition of corpus delicti. Until recently, Texas
had required all three elements to be corroborated. This requirement was expressly overturned In
Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In New York, a proposed 1969
legislative modification to expand the New York rule to include the identity element was never
adopted. See Committee on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedure, The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, 1969 Legislative Bull. No. 11.
42. In fact, some crimes are definable only in terms of an identifiable defendant. The
defendant's identity is not at issue in a perjury, bribe receiving, or income tax fraud case.
Corroboration of the corpus delicti of these charges would thus include corroboration of identity.
See Veldorale, The Principle of Corpus Delicti and the Evidence Pertaining Thereto, 39 Temp.
L.Q. 1, 49 (1965).
43. The only other doctrine incorporating the corpus delicti concept is the evidentiary rule in
homicide law, discussed at note 25 supra, that requires proof of death or criminal agency to be
direct, that is, through real evidence or eyewitness testimony. 7 J. Wigmore supra note 1, § 2081.
In New York, this rule was first set forth in Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179, 184 (1858), which
stated that the law of homicide required direct proof of death or the act which produced death.
Codified in the 1881 Penal Code, the requirement was that "[n]o person can be convicted of
murder or manslaughter unless the death of the person alleged to have been killed and the fact of
killing by the defendant, as alleged, are each established as independent facts; the former by
direct proof and the latter beyond a reasonable doubt." Act of June 30, 1882, ch. 384, § 181, 1882
N.Y. Laws 540 (codified as Penal Law § 1041, N.Y. Cons. L. (1909)) (repealed 1966) (emphasis
added). This section was omitted in the recent revision of the Penal Law, ch. 1030, 1965 N.Y.
Laws 2343, 2503 (effective 1967). Thus, it is now possible for a homicide conviction to depend
entirely on circumstantial evidence, without the finding of a body or eyewitness testimony of the
homicidal act. New York has joined the great majority of jurisdictions in relying on the adequacy
of circumstantial evidence. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2081, 422 n.8.
CONFESSION CORROBORATION
With respect to corroboration of confessions, the corpus delicti version was
adopted in several early American cases, and the majority of jurisdictions
followed Simon Greenleaf's treatise which declared: "In the United States,
the prisoner's confession, when the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, has
been held insufficient for his conviction; and this opinion best accords with
the humanity of the criminal code, and with the great deal of caution applied
in receiving and weighing cases . . . . 44 Jurisdictions differ considerably
about many aspects of this rule, to the extent that, in practice, there is no real
"majority rule." 45 The issues subject to a wide variance of interpretation are:
(1) which elements of the offense must be corroborated, and (2) what amount
of corroboration is necessary. Many jurisidictions, including New York, have
made the rule quite malleable by stretching one of these requirements, often
at the expense of the other, to achieve a particular result in a given case. 46
Perhaps the first question posed by the corpus delicti version of corrobora-
tion is whether the corroborative evidence must tend to confirm all of the
material elements of a crime.47 For example, a conviction for second degree
arson in New York requires the prosecutor to prove the actor (1) started a fire
(conduct); (2) intentionally (mens rea); (3) causing damage to a building
(result); and (4) another person was present in the building at the time
(attendant circumstance); and (5) the actor knew or should have known this
(attendant circumstance). 48 Which of these five elements must be corrobo-
rated? Since the definition of corpus delicti itself requires that the result be
produced by criminal, not natural or accidental, means, it is clear that the
corroboration must tend to establish at least the result element of the offense,
such as a dead body in a homicide, missing property in a larceny, and a
burned building in an arson. Direct corroborative evidence of the result by
itself is fully sufficient to satisfy the "reappearing victim" rationale. 49 How-
44. 1 S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 217, at 278-80 (12th ed. 1866).
45. See AnnoL, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1318-19 (1956); Margolis, Corpus Delicti: Stale of the
Disunion, 2 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 44, 45-46 (1968).
46. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 253 Ind. 235, 252 N.E.2d 572 (1969). The majority held that in
a felony murder charge the underlying felony need not be corroborated. The dissent declared this
a clear break with precedent, warning, "we are here substituting expediency and hysteria for
deliberation and judgment." Id. at 253, 252 N.E.2d at 581 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
techniques used by the Pennsylvania courts to vary that state's strict requirements are discussed
in Comment, Pennsylvania's Corpus Delicti Rule in Criminal Confession Cases, 77 Dick. L. Rev.
297, 305 (1972-73). The New York rule is analyzed in pt. In infra.
47. A "material element" is defined, e.g., as "an element that does not relate exclusively to the
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i) the
harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii)
the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct." Model Penal Code § 1.13 (10)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). New York does not directly define such elements, but uses the
term "material element" in the same fashion as does the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal
Law § 15.10 (McKinney 1975).
48. N.Y. Penal Law § 150.15 (McKinney 1975).
49. This appears to be Wigmore's basis for limiting the definition of corpus delicti to the
specific injury or loss. Circumstantial corroboration, however, does not provide complete
assurance that the victim will not reappear, yet may" be used to satisfy the requirement in all
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ever it is equally clear that where an offense contains no result element, such
as is true of conspiracies or attempts for example, 50 neither the corpus delicti
concept, nor the reappearing victim rationale is at all relevant since the
burning of the building, or similar result, is not even alleged. 5 1 Despite this,
the requirement of corpus delicti corroboration has been extended in most
jurisdictions to offenses without result elements.5 2
Because corpus delicti as it is usually defined incorporates a requirement of
criminality, it would appear that the corroboration should extend beyond the
result to the required level of culpability (mens rea); for example, intent to
burn a building; knowing possession of a dangerous weapon; reckless creation
of a risk of serious physical harm to another; or negligent causation of
another's death. Although negligence and recklessness are to a great extent
objective standards, most crimes involve higher levels of culpability, such as
knowledge and intent, which are subjective and therefore inextricably linked
to the identity of the accused.5 3 Since a high level of "criminality" is thus
always inseparable from the actor's identity, which is not part of the corpus
delicti, most jurisdictions do not require the corroboration of this degree of
culpability.54 Instead, these jurisdictions follow a rule which holds corrobora-
tion of criminality in the lowest degree sufficient to corroborate any degree of
the crime.55 Thus, for example, if the circumstances surrounding a death
jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions where the weight of circumstantial corroboration may be
slight, the reappearing victim rationale is essentially undercut. See California's Corpus Delicti
Rule, supra note 15, at 1088 & n.162.
50. "Attempt" requires "conduct which tends to effect the commission of [a] crime." N.Y.
Penal Law § 110.00 (McKinney 1975). A defendant may be' charged with conspiracy if, with the
requisite mental culpability, he "agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause [conduct
constituting a crime]." Id. § 105.00. In neither case is there a requirement that the predicate
crime actually take place.
51. This problem is discussed in Veldorale, supra note 42, at 4. The author suggests using
"criminal occurrence" as the corpus delicti for those crimes not involving a specific loss or injury.
Rather than illuminating the deficiencies of the corpus delicti concept, this approach appears
cosmetic at best.
52. Proof of the Corpus Delicti, supra note 1, at 673-74. In New York, the rule was almost
always raised in felony cases. The 1971 Criminal Procedure Law extends the coverage of the rule
by making it applicable to all "offenses," rather than "crimes." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50
(McKinney 1971). "Offense" includes violations, whereas "crime" does not. N.Y. Penal Law §
10.00(1),(3),(6) (McKinney 1975).
53. Criminal negligence is the gross deviation from an objective standard of behavior. N.Y.
Penal Law § 15.05(4) (McKinney 1975). Recklessness goes beyond criminal negligence in
requiring that the actor is "aware of and consciously disregards" a risk. Id. § 15.05(3). This aspect
of recklessness, as well as the existence of intent or knowledge on the part of the actor, id. §
15.05(1)-(2), may be corroborated only by circumstantial evidence or a judicial admission.
54. See Veldorale, supra note 42, at 22 (concluding that intent is unique to the defendant and
thus not part of the corpus delicti).
55. Many modern criminal codes structure penalties so that they correspond in degree with
levels of increased culpability and aggravating attendant circumstances. One of the five "general
purposes" of the Penal Law in New York is "[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between
serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor." N.Y. Penal Law §
1.05(4) (McKinney 1975).
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indicate at least criminal negligence, a defendant may be convicted of any
degree of homicide for which criminally negligent homicide is a lesser in-
cluded offense, including intentional murder. Once the corroboration of
"criminality" is established, the defendant's confession may supply the sole
proof as to any greater degree of culpability.
5 6
By the same reasoning, corroboration of attendant circumstances contained
within the statutory definition of an offense is not required. In New York, for
example, heavier penalties are imposed for certain crimes if it is proved that
the conduct took place at night,5 7 or was accomplished by means of a
dangerous instrument,5 8 or in concert with another person present.5 9 If the
defendant's confession contains facts regarding such aggravating circum-
stances, most jurisdictions would not require such facts to be corroborated in
order to convict the defendant of the higher degree offense. 60 This is so even if
the defendant could show that the facts were highly unreliable.
6 1
In a word, the corpus delicti version of corroboration is satisfied by proof of
result where applicable and the lowest levels of culpability and circumstances
associated with the crime charged. This is nothing more than a compromise
between a very strict rule, usable by defendants as a technical loophole to
avoid conviction, 62 and no rule at all. A requirement that the prosecution
corroborate every element and its corresponding culpability63 would be a great
56. See, e.g., People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 680-81, 504 P.2d 1256, 1261, 105 Cal. Rptr.
792, 797 (1973) (en banc); State v. McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 1182-84, 39 S.W.2d 523, 524-25
(1931); People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 314, 178 N.E. 290, 291-92 (1931). Contra, People v.
Allen, 39 Mich. App. 483, 502-04, 197 N.W.2d 874, 884-85 (1972) (Levin, P.J., dissenting), re,'d,
390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973) (dissent adopted per curiam).
57. Compare burglary in the second degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25(2) (McKinney 1975),
with burglary in the third degree, id. § 140.20.
58. Compare assault in the second degree, id. § 120.05(2), with assault in the third degree, id.
§ 120.00(1).
59. Compare robbery in the second degree, id. § 160. 10(l), with robbery in the third degree,
id. § 160.05.
60. See cases cited note 56 supra. Contra, State v. Zwierkowski, 368 Mich. 56, 117 N.W.2d
179 (1962).
61. Thus, for example, a defendant may be charged with robbery in the second degree rather
than robbery in the third degree because of his statement attempting to place most of the blame
on an imaginary accomplice. In most jurisdictions the presence of the accomplice may be proved
solely by defendant's statement, indeed despite evidence of the complaining witness that his
assailant acted alone.
62. Wigmore railed that "this rule . . . [is] today constantly resorted to by unscrupulous
counsel as mere verbal formulas with which to entrap the trial judge . .. [makingi it often a
positive obstruction to the course of justice." 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2070, at 395. The
possibility that the rule would be so used is a major policy factor in the development of judicial
rules of construction tending to weaken the utility of the rule, such as the "confession is the key"
rule devised in New York. See pt IH1(C) infra.
63. The logical consistency of such an approach has appealed to the New York courts from
time to time, but it has never been adopted by the court of appeals. See notes 144-49 infra and
accompanying text.
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burden, especially for those elements which are within the control of the
defendant. 64 The prosecution must still prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Corroboration of the lowest degree of the crime shows there was a
crime committed and it shows that defendant's confession is reliable in at least
some important details. Moreover, the jury need not give all the facts in the
confession equal weight, 65 and will disregard those which are patently unreli-
able. The foregoing reasons mitigate against a strict rule and the need for a
compromise is evident.
6 6
A second type of compromise centers on the weight of corroborated evi-
dence required. Jurisdictions vary significantly in the amount of evidence
required, ranging from "slight"67 to "prima facie" 68 to "substantial".6 9 Within
these stated boundaries, however, the concept of weight gives considerable
discretion to the trial judge, so that in jurisdictions requiring only slight
weight, such as New York, a trial judge (or an appellate judge on review)
may virtually ignore the corroboration requirement. The resulting decisional
law is very difficult to rationalize. It should be noted that even those au-
thorities who recommend abolition of the rule remark that if it is to be
retained, some significant weight of corroboration should be required.7 0
Although the corpus delicti rule appears flexible, it is periodically mis-
applied, and its emphasis on the elements of the crime charged as opposed to
the reliability of the confession has caused several courts and commentators to
question the extent to which the corpus delicti version serves its original
purposes, 71 and to prefer the alternative trustworthiness version.
64. For example, defendant's statement as to his own state of mind is the best evidence of
intent. That the prosecution be required to corroborate this has been called a "second-best"
evidence rule. See People v. Murray, 40 N.Y.2d 327, 335, 353 N.E.2d 605, 610-11, 386
N.Y.S.2d 691, 697 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977); Proof of the Corpus Delicti, supra
note 1, at 647, 654.
65. That the rule intrudes into the jury's province as factfinder is considered a major
drawback. A very strict rule would be too great an intrusion. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S.
147, 153 (1954).
66. The corpus delicti formulation, however, is not the only compromise possible. The rule
proposed in pt. IV infra uses the technique of shifting the burden of going forward to the
defendant as a means to accomplish the same result. See notes 207-13 infra and accompanying
text.
67. See, e.g., State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937); Campbell v. Common-
wealth, 194 Va. 825, 833, 75 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1953).
68. See, e.g., Shuler v. State, 132 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1961); State v. Lutes, 38 Wash. 2d 475, 483,
230 P.2d 786, 790 (1951).
69. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 239 Iowa 693, 703, 31 N.W.2d 337, 342 (1948) (construing a
statute); State v. McPhee, 151 Me. 62, 65, 115 A.2d 496., 500 (1955).
70. "Once the decision to retain the corpus delicti rule has been made, then the amount of
independent evidence required should be truly significant, perhaps even amounting to a prepon.
derance." Developments, supra note 19, at 1077.
71. See, e.g., State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 19-20, 202 A.2d 494, 496 (1964); People v.
Allen, 39 Mich. App. 483, 504, 197 N.W.2d 874, 881 (1972) (Levin, P.J., dissenting), rev'd, 390
Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973) (dissent adopted per curiam); Ackroyd, Corroboration of
Confessions in Federal and Military Trials, 8 Viii. L. Rev. 64, 71 (1962); notes 2027 supra and
accompanying text.
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C. The Trustworthiness Version
The trustworthiness version of corroboration, which emphasizes the inher-
ent unreliability of some confessions, requires the prosecution to produce
evidence corroborative of the confession's reliability. This evidence need not
directly tend to prove the corpus delicti; it is often said that it may in fact be
wholly collateral to the crime itself.7 2 The corroboration, however, directly
relates to the trustworthiness of the important facts contained in the defen-
dant's statement, whereas the corpus delicti version is more concerned with
the elements of the offense. In the federal courts, the rule had its genesis in
Daeche v. United States,73 a 1918 conspiracy case involving a federal anti-
sabotage statute. Judge Learned Hand, after first invoking the corpus delicti
rule, 74 ambiguously went on to state "any corroborating circumstance will
serve in which in the judge's opinion go to fortify the truth of the confes-
sion."75 Later cases followed this latter emphasis on truthworthiness, al-
though at least one circuit court strongly supported the corpus delicti ver-
sion.76
The United States Supreme Court adopted the trustworthiness version as
the "best rule" in two companion cases decided in 1954, Opper v. United
States77 and Smith v. United States.7 8 In Opper, the Court rejected the
72. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 503-04, 158 A.2d 11, 19 (1960), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 933 (1961). One defendant stated in his confession that he had cut his hand during the
attempted robbery of a store and the murder of its owner. This was corroborated by witness
testimony that he had a bandage on his hand the next day. Another defendant's confession
alluded to a gun (not the murder weapon) he had borrowed; this was corroborated by the owner
of the gun. This plus other corroboration, for example the body and blood on the floor, led the
court to find the confessions sufficiently reliable to allow the felony murder charge to stand.
73. 250 F. 566 (2d Cir. 1918).
74. "The corroboration must touch the corpus delicti in the sense of the injury against whose
occurrence the law is directed. ... Id. at 571. Note the use of the word "touch," which
underscores many of the issues raised about the corpus delicti version in pt. 11(B) supra. The
court does not indicate whether every element must be "touched" and what weight of evidence
the word "touch" connotes.
75. Id. (emphasis added). The ambiguity derives from the question whether Judge Hand was
discussing merely the weight of corroboration within the corpus delicti framework, or whether he
was instead attempting to restate the entire rule in terms of trustworthiness. The former
interpretation is more likely, since he cites People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836),
the earliest New York corpus delicti case as support for his argument. Still, the emphasis on
trustworthiness was followed by other courts.
76. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (conviction for transporting
stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce reversed for lack of corroboration of defendant's
knowledge that the car was stolen).
77. 348 U.S. 84 (1954); see Comment, Corroboration ofExtrajudicial Statements, 7 Stan. L. Rev
378 (1955).
78. 348 U.S. 147 (1954). While Opper states the federal corroboration rule as primarily a
question of trustworthiness, 348 U.S. at 93, Smith focuses more closely on the unfairness of the
Government's use of uncorroborated admissions when they are "extracted from one who is under
the pressure of a police investigation-whose words may reflect the strain and confusion
attending his predicament rather than a clear reflection of his past." 348 U.S. at 153. Smith was
cited as authority in Mvalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), which first held the right against
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corpus delicti version, holding that "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration
supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of
their truth."'7 9 The opinion stressed unreliability, indicating that an admis-
sion, confession, and exculpatory statement all have significant possibilities
for error.80 The case involved an admission, which by definition did not
involve every element of the offense charged. In requiring the Government to
introduce "substantial independent evidence," the Court relied on this evi-
dence to serve a "dual function . . . make the admission reliable, thus
corroborating it while also establishing independently the other necessary
elements of the offense." 8 1
The essence of the Opper rule is that a conviction cannot stand where any
element of the crime charged has been proved only by a defendant's state-
ment, and no other evidence in the case corroborates the reliability of the
essential facts admitted in the statement. This rule allows corroboration by
facts which tend to prove the corpus delicti; that is, if the Government makes
a sufficient showing of an element of the offense charged by using additional
self-incrimination applicable to the states. One must question whether this and other relatively
recent developments in the voluntarines doctrine, see notes 27-28 supra, reduce the extent to
which corroboration is needed to prevent police unfairness, see notes 181-92 infra and accom-
panying text.
79. 348 U.S. at 93. Thus, it would appear that the corroborating evidence must Indepen-
dently convince a reasonable juror that the facts are reliable. The Court required that there be
substantial evidence to suppoit this inference of reliability Id. Thus the element of weight of
corroboration remains in the trustworthiness standard. Judges will still disagree, sometimes
vehemently, over whether sufficient corroboration has been produced. See, e.g., State ex ret
J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super. 96, 112, 362 A.2d 1183, 1192 (App. Div. 1976). InJ.P.B., the majority
held a confession by a juvenile to murder subject to a high degree of corroboration because of the
susceptibility of a juvenile to suggestion by the police. Id. The dissent found "more than sufficient
corroborating evidence tending to establish that the juvenile was telling the truth," id. at 119, 362
A.2d at 1195 (Carton, P.J., dissenting), citing inconsistent details and the "unmistakable ring of
truth" in the confession, id. at 118, 362 A.2d at 1195. At least, however, the disagreement
centered around the reliability of the statement rather than the arcane question of whether some
element was part of the corpus delicti.
80. There are several definitions for the terms "confession," "admission," and "exculpatory
statement." See generally 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 821; Developments, supra note 19, at
1031-32. In New York a confession is a direct acknowledgment by the defendant that he
committed the crime charged. People v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y. 323, 326, 83 N.E.2d 537, 538, cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 919 (1949). An "admission," however, is an acknowledgment by the accused of
a fact which tends to prove guilt only when considered with other proven facts; it leaves out some
facts that are necessary for sufficiency of proof of one or more elements of the crime charged.
Thus, a "properly proved and corroborated confession is sufficient for conviction; an admission is
merely circumstantial evidence and needs other proof .... Both are different from an
exculpatory statement, with which the accused attempts to show that he did not or could not
have committed the crime." People v. Utley, 77 Misc. 2d 86, 92, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301, 311 (Nassau
County Ct. 1974) (citations omitted). The recent revision of the New York corroboration rule
explicitly extends the rule to admissions. Under the old rule, the need to corroborate admissions
was unclear. See Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 96, 106-09 (1959).
81. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. at 93.
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evidence, the rule never bars the defendant's statement from consideration by
the jury.8 2 In many cases, in fact, trustworthiness corroboration and corpus
delicti corroboration lead to identical results. The former's advantage lies in
its simplicity and its direct bearing on the reliability of facts stated in the
confession or admission.
Since the Supreme Court's adoption of the trustworthiness version, five
jurisdictions have discarded or refused to adopt the corpus delicti version. 83
Typically, this has been done as a matter of judicial decision, since the
corroboration rule is rarely codified.8 4 The leading case is State v. Lucas,8 s in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court questioned the premise of corpus delicti
corroboration, noting that "[tihere seems to be little difference in kind be-
tween convicting the innocent where no crime has been committed and
convicting the innocent where a crime has been committed, but not by the
accused."'8 6 For example, where the defendant confesses to an actual crime
and the confession is falsely made because of duress or mental disease, the
corpus delicti version gives no protection, whereas the trustworthiness version
does.8 7 The rule set out in Lucas requires corroboration "that when the
defendant confessed he was telling the truth, plus independent proof of the
loss or injury. 8 8 This latter requirement is a vestige of the corpus delicti
version-no longer does "someone's criminality" need corroboration, but cor-
roboration of the "result" is still required to insure that the victim does not
reappear.
Five years later, in 1964, the Connecticut Supreme Court reexamined its
corpus delicti requirement and found that "the application of our definition of
corpus delicti creates complications . . . [which] tend to produce unjust results
because of the greater hazard that mistakes will be made by the court or
jury."8 9 By redefining corpus delicti to exclude "someone's criminality," the
court thus appeared to be following New Jersey, although the emphasis on
trustworthiness as a replacement was unclear. 90 There thus appeared to be a
trend away from the corpus delicti version to simpler variations of corrobora-
82. See United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 167-69 (1954) (other evidence independently
established crime charged so that reliability of facts admitted need not be directly corroborated).
83. State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964); State v. Yoshida, 44 Haw. 352, 354
P.2d 986 (1960); State v. George, 109 N.H. 531, 257 A.2d 19 (1969); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37,
152 A.2d 50 (1959); State v. Paris, 76 N.M. 291, 414 P.2d 512 (1966).
84. New York is one of only seven states that have codified a confession corroboration rule;
all follow the corpus delicti version. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2115 (1947); Ga. Code Ann. §
38-420 (Rev. ed. 1974); Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2, Rule 20(4) (West Supp. 1978); Ky. R. Crim. P.
9.60 (1970); M inn. Stat- Ann. § 634.03 (West 1947); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.50 (McKinney
1971); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.425() (1977).
85. 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959).
86. Id. at 57, 152 A.2d at 60.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 58, 152 A.2d at 61.
89. State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 19-20, 202 A.2d 494, 496 (1964).
90. "Actually, there was a considerable amount of corroboration indicating the trustworthi-
ness of the confessions." Id. at 21, 202 A.2d at 497.
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tion. New York declined the opportunity to revise its rule when the new
Criminal Procedure Law was adopted in 1970.91
III. THE NEW YORK RULE
A. History and Development
New York's rule, first adopted as common law in 1836,92 then codified in
1881 and again in 1971, 93 embodies the corpus delicti version. 94 Since the
original codification, the rule was applied in more than 100 reported cases. A
review thereof reveals a confused patchwork of justifications for the convic-
tion or acquittal of particular defendants. 9s The first two New York cases, 96
both decided in 1836, illustrate the multiple policies used to support the rule.
People v. Hennessey97 involved a civil servant who had been convicted, solely
on the basis of his confession, of embezzling tax monies. Citing the fact that
the confession was the only evidence produced in the case, although proof of
payment of the taxes to the accused could have been shown through wit-
nesses, the court adopted the corpus delicti rule as justification for overturn-
ing the conviction.98 Hennessey emphasized the importance of requiring the
prosecution to produce something more than an extrajudicial plea of guilty. 99
In a companion case, People v. Badgley, 100 the court limited the scope of
the rule. The defendant had forged the signature of a merchant named Clark
to a note, and then had given it as security to prevent execution of other
judgments. Defendant later admitted that he, not Clark, had drawn the note.
91. Corroboration of confessions was a minor issue in the context of the sweeping revisions
encompassed in the 1970 Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 3117. One court has
noted that the New York Legislature did not adopt the "more liberal" trustworthiness rule,
although the courts of its neighboring states had so recently shifted to it. People v. Jennings, 40
App. Div. 2d 357, 361 n.3, 340 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 n.3, affd, 33 N.Y.2d 880, 307 N.E.2d 561, 352
N.Y.S.2d 533 (1973). However, it is quite probable that the legislature's act did not constitute a
ratification of the corpus delicti concept so much as a reluctance to change a rule that had
apparently been serviceable in the past.
92. People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53, 57, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). Although the opinion Itself
is somewhat unclear as to whether the corpus delicti version is being invoked, later cases often
referenced the headnote which set forth the rule more directly. See id. at 53.
93. See note 4 supra for the legislative history of the New York rule.
94. Note that the codified versions do not mention corpus delicti expressly as did People v.
Badgley, 16 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). Yet clearly the New York rule has always been
categorized as requiring corpus delicti corroboration. See, e.g., People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y. 374,
378, 16 N.E. 676, 678 (1888); 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2071, at 397, 399 n.4.
95. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 124-26 & 151-52 infra.
96. People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); People v. Badgley, 16 Wend.
53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
97. 15 Wend. 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
98. Id. at 155.
99. To allow the prosecutor thus to obtain the equivalent of a guilty plea would encourage
reliance on inquisitorial methods, leading to abuse of power. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
100. 16 Wend. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
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After posting bond, he regained possession of the note and immediately
burned it, thus destroying any direct evidence of the forgery. 10 1 The proof of
criminality thus depended completely on defendant's statement. In upholding
the conviction, the court stated that the corroborative evidence may be
circumstantial and need not be so great as to establish independently a prima
facie case.10 2 Defendant's own act of destroying the note had provided
sufficient corroboration of the admission-"[w]hy destroy a note against a
responsible maker, if it was genuine?"10 3 In addition, although Clark had
died before the trial, the prosecutor had called Clark's son, an active member
in his father's firm, as a witness, and he disclaimed any knowledge of the note
or the underlying transaction. This contrasted with Hennessey in that the
"highest and best evidence in the power of the prosecutor was produced."'1t°
Finally, the court noted the defendant's failure to produce any evidence
tending to show his admission to be false, even though "he knew . . . the
maker, and... could at least have given some proof of the transaction out of
which the note arose."' 05 The court simply was not willing to allow the
corroboration rule to be used as a technical loophole.10 6
With the two extremes already delineated, the rule became available for
application to the many confession cases which occupied the middle ground.
While few prosecutors subsequently followed the Hennessey approach to law
enforcement, and few defense attorneys were inclined to imitate Badgley's
counsel, there were a number of cases which necessitated narrower rulings on
the scope of the rule. Although one would imagine that the basic issue in these
cases was whether in fact there was a crime at all (the supposed purpose for
corpus delicti corroboration), in reality the key issues were the reliability of
the confession and the police practices accompanying it.t07 Because the New
101. Id. at 57-58. Note that the defendant claimed he fabricated the fact that the note was a
forgery in order to regain possession of it. This raised a genuine question as to the reliability of
the fact admitted. The court balanced this assertion against the fact that when defendant did
regain possession he destroyed the note. The analysis of the court clearly relates to reliability, and
much less clearly to corpus delicti.
102. Id. at 59.
103. Id. at 58.
104. Id. at 59; see text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
105. 16 Vend. at 58.
106. Badgley pointed to many cases in which "slight corroborating facts were held sufficient."
Id. at 59 (emphasis added). Thus, New York became a jurisdiction using a minimal weight
standard.
107. E.g., People v. Cuozzo, 292 N.Y. 85, 54 N.E.2d 20 (1944) (mentally retarded defendant
confessed to authorities while under custodial interrogation three years after the event); People v.
Joyce, 233 N.Y. 61, 134 N.E. 836 (1922) (mentally retarded defendant confessed to felony murder
under circumstances indicating he was deceived by police into falsely incriminating himself);
People v. Ramos, No. 2109172, slip op. at 19-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 1975) (mentally retarded
defendant's confession to fire marshall investigating possible arson showed substantial indicia of
unreliability); People v. Rooks, 40 Misc. 2d 359, 243 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (juvenile
defendant, after nine hours of police questioning, confessed to attempted rape and possible killing
of 9-year old girl); People v. Shanks, 201 Misc. 511, 108 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Kings County Ct. 1951),
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York voluntariness doctrine was until recently highly circumscribed and did
not offer defendants much protection against police practices that tended to
elicit unreliable confessions, '08 courts occasionally used the corroboration rule
to protect defendants' rights. Although the corpus delicti formulation was not
easily manipulated, it was used to protect the defendant in circumstances
where there was ambiguity as to whether a criminal act had occurred. 10 9
Thus, where the crime charged has obviously taken place, the corpus delicti
formulation offers no protection. For example, if the victim is found dead of a
bullet wound not obviously self-inflicted, an internally inconsistent confession
made during a twenty-four hour interrogation three years after the event by a
mentally retarded defendant, unacquainted with the victim, can be sufficient
evidence for conviction. Subject to the general admissibility criterion of com-
petence, the reliability of the confession need never be corroborated.
For purposes of analysis, the New York decisional law can be classified in
three categories: (1) cases involving unreliable confessions and an ambiguous
event; (2) cases involving reliable confessions and an ambiguous event; and (3)
cases involving unreliable confessions and a clearly criminal event."10
Blackletter rules were developed so that the proper result would be reached
for cases in each category. A strict corpus delicti formulation has been used
where the confession is unreliable and the event ambiguous.I' The so-called
"confession is the key" rule has been devised for cases in which the confession
is reliable and the event ambiguous.112 Finally, attempts have been made to
require the "each and every element" rule where the event was clearly
criminal, but the confession unreliable.113 These rules purport to stress
various nuances of the corpus delicti construction; however, they only tangen-
aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 1082, 113 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1952) (defendant, in jail for another crime,
confessed to murdering his roommate nine years earlier).
108. See note 27 supra.
109. In a homicide, if the cause of death is stabbing or shooting, a presumption of criminality
is invariably made; that is, the cause of death itself is sufficient corroboration of a criminal act.
However, if the cause of death is drowning, falling, or is not discernable, there is a reasonable
probability that the victim may have accidentally perished-no presumption of criminality is
made and more corroborating evidence is required. See Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder,
48 Va. L. Rev. 173, 192-95 (1962). The effect of this rule, which is a direct consequence of the
criminality aspect of corpus delicti, is that the availability of corroboration is often totally
unrelated to the rationales underlying the corroboration requirement. For example, defendant X
confesses to deliberately pushing the victim to his death from a crowded subway platform, while
defendant Y admits accidentally shooting the victim while showing him his gun. Assuming that
the victim's body is found in both cases, that both statements are made under similar conditions
of police interrogation and have the same degree of reliability, the corpus delicti version could
lead to the acquittal of X for lack of corroboration, whereas the jury would get the opportunity of
convicting Y.
110. If the confession is clearly reliable and the event is clearly criminal, the corpus delicti
rule does not apply, nor is the court overly concerned with defendant's rights.
111. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 126-41 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 142-57 infra and accompanying text.
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tially relate to the issue of reliability, and generally ignore the question
whether the prosecution has presented the best available evidence of the crime
charged.114 As will be shown, these latter policies, rather than technical
nuances, in fact form the basis of the selection of the rule to be applied in a
particular case.
B. The Cuozzo Rule: Unreliable
Confession and Ambiguous Event
In People v. Cuozzo, Is defendant, twenty-five years old and a "mid-grade
moron," confessed that he had raped a nineteen-year-old girl, struck her over
the head and left her on the railroad tracks, where her body was mutilated by
a freight train. Eleven confessions were made in all, with varying levels of
inconsistency with each other and with known extrinsic facts. 1 16 All confes-
sions were made to the police during what today would be considered
custodial interrogation. 117 Finally, the confessions were made three and
one-half years after the event; and although the police had investigated the
incident at the time it occurred, no "important information" had been
uncovered. 118
The majority opinion extensively reviewed the above matters of reliability.
Then, implicitly admitting that the admissibility of the confession was proba-
bly within the trial court's discretion,'" 9 the opinion proceeded to consider
corpus delicti corroboration as a rule wholly unrelated to the truthfulness of
the confession. 120 Construing prior corpus delicti case law, the majority
concluded that the rule must be strictly applied; the additional evidence,
direct or circumstantial, must tend to show "the crime was in fact committed
by someone. ' 12 1 In this case, the majority found that the victim's body did
114. See notes 19-23, 26 supra and accompanying text.
115. 292 N.Y. 85, 54 N.E.2d 20 (1944).
116. Defendant did not at first say he raped the victim. He also changed the place where he
said he had first seen her, his original statement being inconsistent with the testimony of other
witnesses. Several other inconsistencies were noted by the majority opinion. Id. at 89-91, 54
N.E.2d at 22-23.
117. The police had arrested defendant on another charge, and when he asked whether they.
"had ever found out who killed" the victim, they took him to a barn and questioned him at
length. Id. at 88, 54 N.E.2d at 22.
118. Id.
119. Defendant had raised on appeal the issue of involuntariness due to insanity. Id. at 95, 54
N.E.2d at 26. But there was medical evidence indicating he "had the capacity to make a valid
confession." Id. at 99, 54 N.E.2d at 27-28 (Conway, J., dissenting). By ruling on the corpus delicti
issue, the majority deftly avoided the entire subject of competence.
120. "Having examined those confessions with an eye to trustworthiness, we pass to a
consideration of an entirely different question .... Id. at 91, 54 N.E.2d at 23 (emphasis
supplied). Thus, the Cuozzo court purportedly disclaimed trustworthiness entirely as a supporting
rationale for corroboration. One may well ask, then, why a three-page review of trustworthiness
was at all necessary. See also People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y. 374, 382, 16 N.E. 676, 680 (1888)
(conclusion of sufficient corpus delicti corroboration justified by showing confession was trustwor-
thy).
121. 292 N.Y. at 92, 54 N.E.2d at 24.
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not bear the marks of murder, nor was there a sufficient degree of other
circumstantial evidence tending to show "someone's criminality." Conse-
quently, the corpus delicti was not corroborated, and the conviction was
overturned.
The majority did not discuss evidence introduced at trial of the victim's
healthy state of mind or the timing of events, evidence which tended to
eliminate the possibilities of suicide and accident. As presented by the dissent,
these facts would appear to support the corroboration of criminality if a
minimal amount of weight is sufficient. 122 The majority opinion did note the
principle that the corroborative evidence may be "of whatever weight" and
need not be "full, direct and positive evidence of the corpus delicti,"'1 23 but
the opinion ignored evidence of a type which had been held in other cases to
be sufficient corroboration.
Thus, despite the majority's invocation of a strict corpus delicti rule, the
underlying reason for overturning the conviction was the distrust of the
reliability of the defendant's confessions. 124 Unable to find lack of competence
or voluntariness, the majority used the corpus delicti rule as a ground for
overturning the conviction. The use of the rule, though, depended completely
on the lack of a presumption of criminality where the victim is hit by a train;
had the body shown any signs of human violence, the conviction apparently
would have stood, despite the conclusions as to the unreliability of the
confession. 125 In this regard, the Cuozzo rule exemplifies the manner in which
122. "The jury could well find that the deceased had not committed suicide for the testimony
showed that she was ... a strong, robust, athletic, happy young girl.. . ." Id. at 100, 54 N.E.2d
at 28 (Conway, J., dissenting). As to the possibility of accident, the dissent argued that based on
the time the victim was last seen, a jury could reasonably have concluded that if she had fallen,
an earlier train would have hit her. Id. at 100-01, 54 N.E.2d at 28. For a recent decision which
follows the dissent's reasoning, see People v. Jennings, 40 App. Div. 2d 357, 340 N.Y.S.2d 25,
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 880, 307 N.E.2d 561, 352 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1973), discussed note 154 ihffra.
123. 292 N.Y. at 92, 54 N.E.2d at 24 (quoting People v. Conroy, 287 N.Y. 201, 202 (1941)).
124. The corroborative evidence, reviewed by the majority, tended to prove the truth of some
facts in the confession, and would apparently have been sufficient under the federal trustworthi-
ness standard. For example, the defendant accurately described the victim's underclothing, about
which the majority makes this remarkable statement: "Nothing in the record gives us any clue as
to how defendant found that out unless he was the killer. But that one mysterious and
unexplained piece of special knowledge on his part, significant though it may be and important as
it surely would be on the question of the weight to be given the confession, is not proof of a
homicidal killing . . . ." Id. at 94-95, 54 N.E.2d at 25. Compare Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In Self, defendant confessed to killing two girls and placing their
bodies partially submerged in a bayou. Police were then led to the site where the bodies were
uncovered, but in too decomposed a state to discern cause of death. Rather than hold that the
"mysterious" knowledge of defendant related only to the question of weight, the court, stressing
the reliability of the confession, found sufficient corroboration. Id. at 837. The Self court, unlike
the Cuozzo majority, found evidence about the victim's excellent health corroborative of death by
criminal means. Id. It is highly questionable whether a New York court presented with the facts
of Setf would follow Cuozzo.
125. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
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the corpus delicti version can be so strictly construed as to be ostensibly
divorced from all its original rationales.
C. The "Confession is the Key" Rule: Reliable
Confession and Ambiguous Event
There are many cases in which the event is ambiguous, yet the confession
has such indicia of reliability that the corroboration rule appears, as in
Badgley, to be merely a technical loophole. To prevent the possibility of
letting an obviously guilty defendant go free,' 26 the court has devised the
"confession is the key" rule.
This rule allows the corroborative evidence to be proof of circumstances
which, although innocent in themselves, are "nevertheless calculated to sug-
gest the commission of crime, and for the explanation of which the confession
furnishes the key."1 2 7 In effect, weightless evidence is bolstered by the confes-
sion itself to yield sufficient corroboration. 28 In one case,' 2 9 the defendant
had confessed to starting a fire in his room because of "an urge" and was
convicted of arson despite the lack of extrinsic evidence as to the criminal
origin of the fire. Sufficient corroboration had been found in a fire marshall's
testimony that the fire had started in defendant's closet, which lacked wiring
or heating fixtures, and defendant's immediate disappearance after the event
and subsequent reappearance with dyed hair.' 30 Another case resulted in the
conviction of a husband for drowning his wife, despite the lack of "signs of
human violence" on the body.' 3 The corroboration consisted of evidence that
the defendant was seen with his wife near the location at which he confessed
that he had drowned her, and that he was involved with another woman
whom he had promised to marry and with whom he ran off after his wife's
disappearance.' 3 2 In neither of these cases did the court have adequate proof,
under the Cuozzo rule, of "someone's criminality." The courts instead weighed
evidence of motive or appearance of guilt, and found such evidence, "when
interpreted in the light of the confession . . . , strongly corroborative of its
truth."'1 33 Thus, by looking at the confession itself a court can turn a highly
126. "It would shock common sense to say in the light of the confession that all of [the
evidence produced does] not in any degree tend to prove a crime. . . . and that the defendant
should be discharged because some other impossible evidence has not been produced." People v.
Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 60-61, 85 N.E. 809, 814 (1908).
127. People v. Jaehne, 103 N.Y. 182, 199-200, 8 N.E. 374, 381 (1886).
128. It is universally agreed that the corroborative evidence must be independently
admissible-that is, competent, not hearsay, and relevant. Proof of the Corpus Delicti, supro note
1, at 659. Often the corroborative evidence is relevant only if the confession is taken as true. In
this way, the actual degree of relevance of the external evidence to the crime considered
independently may be infinitesimal; yet with its weight bolstered by the facts in the confession, a
sufficient degree of corroboration is achieved. See cases cited in Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1333
(1956).
129. People v. Reade, 13 N.Y.2d 42, 191 N.E.2d 891, 241 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1963).
130. Id. at 46, 191 N.E.2d at 893, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
131. People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E. 809 (1908).
132. Id. at 59-60, 85 N.E. at 814.
133. People v. Jaehne, 103 N.Y. 182, 199, 8 N.E. 374, 381 (1886).
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ambiguous, or even innocent, fact into one "calculated to suggest"' 34 a crime.
The innocent fact corroborates the reliability of the confession, and the
confession itself then tends to establish the essential elements of the corpus
delicti. This rule appears to operate exactly like the trustworthiness concept of
Opper. 135 To avoid this appearance, the Cuozzo majority limited the "confes-
sion is the key" rule to situations where there is a compelling link between the
defendant and the crime. 136 In essence, the "confession is the key" rule allows
a minimal corroboration requirement for those cases in which the defendant is
so linked with the crime that proof of "someone's criminality" can be shown
by his "presence at the scene, proof of motive, [or] evidence of flight and other
conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt.' 37 This is a recognition that
proof of a crime may rest on a single foundation-and that in such cases,
given the strong evidence against an identified defendant, strict application of
the corpus delicti rule would operate as a loophole.' 13 Yet it is in these cases
particularly that some greater degree of corroboration of reliability should be
demanded, because a person closely linked to a loss would seem more likely to
fabricate a confession because of a mental delusion, misplaced guilt, or
mistake. Typical examples of such confessions include the husband who says
he pushed his wife off the balcony when she may have jumped in his
presence; 139 and the wife who confesses to forcing an overdose of pills on her
husband when he had already taken an overdose himself.140 The weakening
of the protection of the corroboration rule in the very cases where it makes the
most sense to require it is merely one more shortcoming of the corpus delicti
standard. Of course, the "confession is the key" rule is not consistently
applied; in practice, if the "innocent fact" is insufficient to convince the court
of the confession's reliability, the Cuozzo rule will be applied instead. 14 It is
this type of rule selection based on an implicit reliability determination which
134. Id.
135. 348 U.S. 84 (1954); see notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. Jaehne and Opper are
both based on bribery charges, and in both cases the corroborating evidence was found to be
sufficient. The United States Supreme Court used the opportunity to depart from the corpus
delicti standard. Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals, interpreting a statute rather
than operating under common law, was not able to change in such an open manner.
136. See 292 N.Y. at 92, 54 N.E.2d at 24.
137. People v. Reade, 13 N.Y.2d at 46, 191 N.E.2d at 892, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
138. See notes 41-42, 126 supra and accompanying text.
139. See State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964).
140. See Batterbee v. State, 537 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1976).
141. For example, in People v. Shanks, 201 Misc. 511, 108 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Kings County Ct.
1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1082, 113 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1952), defendant confessed to murdering his
roommate nine years earlier by asphyxiation. Finding the medical examiner's corroboration of the
cause of death and the fact that the defendant and the victim were living together insufficient
proof of criminality, the court dismissed the indictment. Cuozzo itself is also a good example:
defendant's corroborated description of the victim's underwear was dubbed a "mysterious and
unexplained piece of special knowledge." 292 N.Y. at 95, 54 N.E.2d at 25. This evidence appears
to be a great deal stronger than an "innocent fact," but was not found sufficient because the court
doubted the overall reliability of the confession.
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typifies the approach of the courts under the New York rule. It may be noted
that a trustworthiness standard, which goes directly to reliability, would most
likely not result in a different holding, but would require the court to decide
the central issue of reliability openly, rather than sub rosa.
D. The "Each and Every Element" Rule:
Attempts To Extend Protection
Beyond Ambiguous Events
As mentioned above, 142 a difficulty with the corpus delicti version lies in
determining which elements of the offense charged must be corroborated. The
strictest interpretation is one that would require the corroboration to touch
each and every element of the offense. 143 Under this interpretation, a convic-
tion could not be had for an offense unless every element of that offense
except defendant's identity were corroborated. Moreover, the judge could not
charge a greater degree of the offense than the degree which was corrobo-
rated. New York courts have occasionally relied on an "each and every
element" reasoning as a means of broadening the protection of the rule. An
early example of this can be seen in Judge Crane's concurring opinion in
People v. Joyce. 144 On the basis of a confession judged to be voluntary by the
jury, the defendant was convicted of felony murder of a storekeeper. The
record was replete with circumstances pointing to the conclusion that defen-
dant's will had been overborne by the police. The court of appeals overturned
the conviction, reasoning that the exclusion of evidence of defendant's mental
retardation was reversible error. 145 Judge Crane offered the corroboration
rule as another ground for reversal, arguing that a felony murder conviction
must contain evidence sufficient to convict for the underlying felony. Al-
though the confession indicated an attempted robbery, there was no corrob-
oration of this element. 146 Crane was searching for consistency in the corrob-
oration requirement-recognizing that the essential element of criminality in a
felony murder is the felony itself. 147 However, Crane's reasoning was rejected
by the court in a later case, People v. Lytton, 148 in which Judge Cardozo
found that a body killed by gunshot wounds was sufficient corroboration of
any degree of homicide, including felony murder. 149
142. See notes 48-66 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
144. 233 N.Y. 61, 72-75, 134 N.E. 836, 840-41 (1922) (Crane, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 70-71, 134 N.E. at 840.
146. Id. at 74, 134 N.E. at 841 (Crane, J., concurring).
147. Judge Crane's reasoning forms the basis of the dissenting opinion in People v. Murray,
40 N.Y.2d 327, 341 n.2, 353 N.E.2d 605, 615 n.2, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691, 701 n.2 (1976) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977).
148. 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931).
149. Id. at 314-16, 178 N.E. at 292. In this case, defendant had admitted that his gun
accidentally went off while he was attempting to rob the victim. This is a confession to felony
murder, which does not require any degree of culpability in the killing, but rests on the theory
that the intent to commit the felony makes the felon culpable for any deaths caused by him in
furtherance of the crime, even when those deaths are accidental. At the time Cardozo wrote the
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People v. Rooks, 1-o a 1963 pre-Miranda case in which the indictment was
initially overturned because of lack of corroboration, presents another exam-
ple of an attempt to apply the "each and every element" rule as a safeguard of
defendant's rights. A fifteen-year-old defendant had made an essentially reli-
able statement to police that he had attempted to rape a nine-year-old girl and
that while he was trying to intimidate her into not telling anyone, had
accidentally "dropped" her off a roof to her death. The corroborative evidence
consisted of the girl's nude body with recognizable signs of attempted sexual
assault. Justice Sobel, the trial judge, perhaps influenced by the police tactics
of holding a minor for nine hours and questioning him for three without
benefit of a lawyer or his parents, 1' 5 found insufficient corroboration of
intentional murder, using Cuozzo as support. 15 2 His holding seems to involve
an obvious misapplication of the corroboration rule, since the corroborative
evidence did tend to show "someone's criminality" within the usual corpus
delicti parameters. Although the cause of death was a fall, the circumstances
clearly indicated the criminal involvement of another person. The opinion
should have distinguished situations in which the victim accidentally causes
his own death from those in which he is accidentally killed by another; 15 3
whereas Cuozzo typifies the former category, Rooks typifies the latter. There is
no doubt that in Rooks a criminal homicide occurred, and this would appear
to satisfy the demands of Lytton's "any degree" rule. 154 What appeared to
Lytton opinion, felony murder did not have to be specifically alleged in a first degree murder
indictment. Id. at 315, 178 N.E. at 292. Under the common law indictment then in use, the jury
had to find the element of malice in order to convict for first degree murder. They could Infer
malice from evidence of premeditation and deliberation, or from evidence of felony. Thus, If six
jurors felt that the act was accidental, but committed during a felony, and six felt It was
intentional, but not committed during a felony, a conviction could result. Under the new
Criminal Procedure Law, this form of indictment has been done away with. See N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 200.30 (McKinney 1971). Cardozo used the common law form of indictment to
support his argument that felony murder is not so different from intent murder to require
different corroboration. The dissenting opinion in People v. Murray refers to the change In
indictments as undercutting this argument and requiring a reversal of Lytton. People v. Murray,
40 N.Y.2d 327, 341-42, 353 N.E.2d 605, 615, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691, 701 (1976) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977). For a discussion of whether felony murder and
intent murder should be interpreted as the same offense under the new law, see note 170 ifra.
150. 40 Misc. 2d 359, 243 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
151. Id. at 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
152. Id. at 376, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
153. Perkins, supra note 109, at 193.
154. Violence of distinctly human origin occurring in proximity to the victim's body has been
held to supply sufficient circumstantial corroboration of homicide. In People v. Jennings, 40 App.
Div. 2d 357, 340 N.Y.S.2d 25, aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 880, 307 N.E.2d 561, 352 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1973),
the body of a 14-year-old girl was found in a state of decomposition, which prevented
establishment of cause of death by laboratory analysis. The court found that the victim's good
health at the time of he6" disappearance, the position of the body when found in the woods (nude
and lying on a coat), and indications of probable sexual assault, collectively constituted sufficient
corroboration of defendant's confession to rape and strangulation. Id. at 362, 340 N.Y.S.2d at
29-30. There is little doubt that the above evidence corroborates rape and felony murder based on
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concern Justice Sobel was the notion that a juvenile (who at the time could
not be convicted of felony murder) should be convicted of intentional murder
without corroboration of such intent. Of course, in this case the confession did
not even admit intent, so the question went beyond the sufficiency of corrob-
oration to the sufficiency of the overall evidence. Had a witness seen the
defendant drop the girl, there is little doubt that a prima facie case of intent
murder would have been established.
Despite the handling it received in Rooks, the "each and every element"
rule is perhaps the only logically consistent version of corpus delicti corrobora-
tion. Other opinions have been written which impliedly 5  or expresslyS 6
approved this interpretation of the corroboration rule. The recent court of
appeals ruling in People v. Murray5 7 leaves the viability of this interpretation
unresolved.
E. People v. Murray: A Benchmark of Confusion
In People v. Murray, defendant Murray had confessed to police officers to
having stabbed the victim during a struggle while he was attempting to rob
him. At trial, the confession was repudiated, the defendant testifying that the
victim was in fact his drug supplier to whom he owed money and whom he
stabbed in self-defense during an argument. 158 Of several counts in the
indictment, those of attempted robbery and attempted larceny were dismissed
by the trial court on the ground that there was insufficient corroboration
under the confession corroboration rule; but an intentional and a felony
murder count went to the jury. The jury found the defendant guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree, a lesser included offense of intentional
murder, and guilty of felony murder.
On appeal of the felony murder charge, the defendant contended that the
dismissal of the underlying felony for lack of corroboration required dismissal
of the felony murder charge on the ground that the culpability underlying the
murder was insufficiently proved. 159 The People, on appeal, relied on several
corpus delicti blackletter rules. One of these, the Lytton rule, formed the basis
rape. However, defendant was convicted of intentional murder, not felony murder. The rationale
for the result is that under the Lytton rule, see note 149 supra, the corroborative evidence tended
to show at least criminal negligence associated with the death, thus corroborating any degree of
homicide, including intentional murder.
155. See, e.g., People v. Ruckdeschel, 51 App. Div. 2d 861, 380 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1976).
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, after the victim had been found stabbed
and with his pants pockets pulled out and torn. The robbery conviction was overturned since
there was no outside proof that anything had been taken. The judge could have charged, of
course, the lesser included offense of attempted robbery.
156. See, e.g., People v. Ramos, No. 2109172, slip op. at 32-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 1975)
(indictment of defendant on charges of "depraved indifference" murder dismissed for lack of
corroboration of mens rea).
157. 40 N.Y.2d 327, 353 N.E.2d 605, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948
(1977).
158. Id. at 330, 353 N.E.2d at 607, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
159. Id. at 334, 353 N.E.2d at 610, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
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of an opinion sustaining conviction written by Judge Gabrielli, and concurred
in by two other judges. 160 Lytton and cases following it provided that a dead
body with signs of human-inflicted violence is sufficient corroboration of any
degree and any method of criminal homicide, including felony murder. 16 1
Judge Gabrielli, finding "[n]o reason .. . to now depart from these sound,
established precedents,' 62 held that no corroboration of the underlying felony
was necessary, 163 and that the evidence that the victim's death was caused by
a nonaccidental knife wound satisfied the corroboration requirement.'16 The
opinion proceeded to bolster the available corroborating evidence by consider-
ing defendant's in-court statements regarding his presence at the scene, drug
addiction, and flight from the scene as circumstantial corroboration of the
commission of a crime.165 This argument creates at least two difficulties.
First, it is an extention of the "confession is the key" rule to situations in
which the defendant is not "compellingly linked" to the crime. 166 Second,
evidence of guilt in general does not tend to corroborate the reliability of the
essential facts regarding the underlying felony.
As an alternative to the Lytton rule, the Gabrielli opinion stated that "some
of us hold that even if [corroboration of the felony were required] ...[t]here
was sufficient evidence of the predicate felony to satisfy the meager require-
ments of [the New York rule]."'1 67 The evidence of a struggle and the victim's
temporarily missing wallet constituted this "meager" measure. Judge Wach-
tier concurred in this finding solely because he found sufficient corroboration
of the predicate felony. 168
Three judges voted to reverse. In an opinion by Judge Jasen, they took
issue with every argument put forth by the others. Beginning with the
question of weight, Judge Jasen condemned the "corroborative evidence"
found by the others as nothing more than appellate court speculation. 169 As to
the requirement of corroborating the underlying felony, the dissent strongly
supported reversing Lytton, pointing to changes in the method of indict-
ment, 170 but basically taking issue with the underlying rationale of the rule.
160. Id. at 332, 353 N.E.2d at 608, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
161. See notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text.
162. 40 N.Y.2d at 334, 353 N.E.2d at 610, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 332-33, 353 N.E.2d at 609, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
165. Id. at 333, 353 N.E.2d at 609, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 695. Notice that while a defendant's
subsequent extrajudicial statements cannot be used to corroborate, subsequent in-court state-
ments can be used as corroboration. But to corroborate defendant's extrajudicial admission of
attempted robbery by using his in-court testimony denying that admission seems to lack any
degree of logic. Certainly, one statement can be used to impeach the reliability of the other, but to
allow one to corroborate the other puts the defendant in the unfortunate position of having his
in-court testimony corroborate his confession, which in turn impeaches his in-court testimony.
166. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
167. 40 N.Y.2d at 335, 353 N.E.2d at 611, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
168. Id. (Wachtler, J., concurring). There is no mention that the trial judge is being reversed,
in effect, on his decision to dismiss the underlying felonies.
169. Id. at 339, 353 N.E.2d at 613, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 699. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 341-42, 353 N.E.2d at 614-15, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see
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The two three-judge opinions indicate a basic split regarding the policy and
purpose of corroboration. The Gabrielli opinion stressed that the offense
charged (in this case murder in the second degree) was shown to have
occurred through other evidence, that is, the body. There will be no "reap-
pearing victim" or conviction based on a non-existent crime. The basic
policies behind the corroboration requirement are thus satisfied, and "the
truth of the confession ... is for the jury."''1 The opinion by Judge Jasen, on
the other hand, stressed the inconsistency of dismissing a felony charge for
want of corroboration, but allowing a felony murder charge to stand. The
opinion seemed to apply the "each and every element" rule,' 7 2 holding that
felony murder (not murder in the second degree) is the "offense charged" and
that to corroborate this offense, the People must corroborate the underlying
felony. The policy behind the Jasen opinion is that facts contained in a
note 149 supra. A major problem is whether the corroboration must tend to prove "felony
murder," "murder in the second degree," or "homicide." Under the old common law indictment,
such distinctions were not important, according to Lytton. Yet the legislative intent behind the
new Criminal Procedure Law was clearly to abandon common law indictments. Denzer, Practier
Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.30, at 215-16 (McKinney 1971). Section 200.30
requires the prosecution to charge only one offense per count, and defines "offense" in a manner
different from its meaning elsewhere in New York criminal law. Normally, "offense" is defined as
"conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided," N.Y. Penal
Law § 10.00(1) (McKinney 1975), a definition applicable to the Criminal Procedure Law, see
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20 (McKinney 1971). Generally, the term refers to captioned offenses
under the Penal Law punishable by a specific prison term, e.g., "Murder in the second degree,"
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) (class A-I felony); "Manslaughter in the first degree,"
id. § 125.20 (class B felony); see id. § 70.00. Section 200.30 indicates that if a Penal Law
provision "defines the offense named in the title thereof by providing, in different subdivisions or
paragraphs, different ways in which such named offense may be committed," each method must
be charged in a different count. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.30 (McKinney 1971). Subsequent
sections use the term "offense charged" to refer to an offense contained within a count of the
indictment. See, e.g., id. § 300.10(3). Under this nomenclature, "felony murder," N.Y. Penal
Law § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975), is a different "offense charged" from "intent murder," id. §
125.25(1), even though they are the same "offense," i.e., "murder in the second degree." The
affirmers in Murray were not impressed by such "technical formalities." They found no evidence
in the legislative history that the "offense charged" which must be corroborated under the rule
meant anything other than what it has always meant. 40 N.Y.2d at 334, 353 N.E.2d at 610, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 696. The dissenters, however, pointed to the new system of pleading and proof,
which incorporates the corroboration rule, as an indication of legislative intent. Id. at 341-43, 353
N.E.2d at 615-16, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 701-02. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, when a
murder charge is presented to the jury under two theories, such as intent and felony murder, the
judge has complete discretion to submit either or both. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 300.40(3)(a),
300.30(3) (McKinney 1971); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.25(2) (McKinney 1975). Any count submitted,
however, must be supported by legally sufficient evidence, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 300.30(l)
(McKinney 1971), which means that all corroboration requirements have been met, id. § 70.10.
This is a structure which insures that the proof of a crime clearly supports one type of conduct
which constitutes that crime. The structure requires a count-by-count analysis, and the corrob-
oration rule should be interpreted within the spirit of this structure.
171. 40 N.Y.2d at 335, 353 N.E.2d at 611, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
172. See notes 142-49 supra and accompanying text.
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confession are inherently untrustworthy, that police should be required to find
corroborating evidence where possible, 173 and that it is basically unfair to
turn a manslaughterer into a murderer on the basis of his own uncorroborated
admission of a felony.17 4 Note that, far from letting defendant go free on a
legal technicality, the rule as applied by the dissenters would upset only the
felony murder conviction, and not the manslaughter conviction. The fears of
using the rule as a loophole are thus not justified in this particular case.
Reliability as a policy factor was apparently ignored by both sides in
Murray. It is perhaps because there is no clear difference of opinion on
reliability that so much emphasis can be placed on the "technical" functioning
of the corroboration rule. The reliability issue, however, is the most viable
factor supporting a corroboration rule. Had the defendant's statement had a
greater degree of reliability, the dissent would not have been shocked at his
conviction. For example, if instead of being made to police, his admission had
been made to a friend immediately after the event, it would have the kind of
reliability which forms the basis of the res gestae exception to the hearsay
rule,175 and it would be difficult to justify a corroboration requirement for
such an admission. On the other hand, if defendant's statement had a greater
degree of untrustworthiness, such as inconsistency with other facts (for exam-
ple, if reliable proof was offered at trial that the victim was indeed the
defendant's drug supplier), the conviction for felony murder would appear to
nullify completely the utility of the corroboration rule as protective of the
defendant's rights. Under such circumstances one wonders whether the
confirming judges would follow Lytton so rigidly. Perhaps because the present
173. "The policy of this State is that no person can be convicted solely upon his own
admission. Given this policy, it is, as a matter of logic, impossible to conclude that a felony of
which there is legally insufficient proof may yet form the basis of a felony murder conviction. Our
conclusion is basic: without sufficient proof of the felony, there cannot be sufficient proof of a
felony murder." 40 N.Y.2d at 342, 353 N.E.2d at 616, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Note the logical case built by considering defendant's statement an
admission of the underlying felony, rather than as a confession to felony murder. The "admis-
sion" focuses the argument on a particular element, on the reliability of the essential facts
admitted which result in conviction. Consider, however, the difficulty of trying to corroborate an
underlying felony such as attempted robbery when the victim, often the only witness, has been
killed. Generally, the method used by the courts has been to accept very insubstantial evidence as
corroboration, a method which, apparently, four members of this court found acceptable.
174. See People v. Allen, 39 Mich. App. 483, 503-04, 197 N.W.2d 874, 885 (1972) (Levin, PJ.,
dissenting), rev'd, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973) (dissent adopted per curiam).
175. People v. McKinney, 65 Mich. App. 131, 237 N.W.2d 215 (1975). Defendant was
convicted of felony murder in a state which requires corroboration of the underlying felony.
Deceased was found in his own home, hands and feet tied, death caused by a gunshot wound in
his chest. Defendant was followed by a witness after leaving the scene, and told him "[I1 only got
a little bit." Although other evidence was found insufficient to corroborate the felony, the court
found that the admission was sufficient in that, as with the res gestae exception to hearsay, the
circumstances of spontaneous utterances carry "sufficient indication of the truth to overcome any
reluctance to convict on the basis" of the admission. Id. at 139, 237 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting
People v. Randall, 42 Mich. App. 187, 192, 201 N.W.2d 292, 295 (1972)); cf. Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147, 155 (1954) (not all admissions require corroboration).
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rule does not make the corroboration relate to trustworthiness, the record was
devoid of enough information to enable the judges to exercise the kind of
appellate review typical of the history of this rule. In any case, the clear
message of Murray is that the current rule-the corpus delicti version-no
longer supports its original rationales. It is time for New York to
restructure its rule, putting reliability back into the equation, and making the
rule capable of rational application.
IV. REPLACING THE NEW YoRK RULE
The confusion resulting from the corpus delicti version lies in the tangle of
policy rationales behind the corroboration requirement. 176 In searching for an
alternative to the current rule, it is important to examine whether these policy
rationales are now served adequately by recent developments in the law of
confessions. If so, perhaps the corroboration requirement can be entirely
eliminated, as has been suggested by several commentators.' 7 7 If, however,
there is a gap in the law which a corroboration rule can close, a workable rule
must be fabricated specifically for that purpose.
A. Current New York Confession Law
As noted earlier,178 the major doctrine in American confession law is the
voluntariness doctrine and its constitutional variants. The voluntariness doc-
trine is premised upon the same concerns which resulted in the development
of the corroboration rule-that involuntary confessions are inherently unreli-
able and yet carry a great deal of weight with the ordinary juror. In New
York, the definition of "involuntary" was so narrow that the rule rarely
prevented unreliable confessions from reaching the jury. ' 7 9 Thus the corrob-
oration rule was sometimes used instead to prevent convictions where the
prosecution used an unreliable confession as a major part of its case.180 This
usage may now be unnecessary since, in 1970, the legislature freed the New
York voluntariness rule from its historical fetters by expanding the circum-
stances under which a confession would be found to be 'involuntarily made", 18
The new law excludes a statement from evidence as involuntarily made if it
was extracted by duress, coercion, or undue pressure (essentially a question of
due process corresponding to pre-Miranda notions of voluntariness), '82 or if it
was obtained:
[b]y a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity or by a person then acting
under his direction or in cooperation with him:
(i) by means of any promise or statement of fact, which . . .creates a substantial
risk that the defendant might falsely incriminate himself; or
176. See notes 17-26 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 27 supra.
180. See notes 124-25 supra and accompanying text.
181. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.45 (McKinney 1971).
182. Id. § 60.45(2)(a).
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(ii) in violation of such rights as the defendant may derive from the constitution of
this state or of the United States. 8 3
The exclusion of statements obtained by methods which create a substantial
risk of falsity represents the first time in New York confession law that a
reliability standard is used as an express standard of admissibility. 184 Thus,
under the old standard a police practice using trickery or deception would
rarely result in the exclusion of the resulting confession, whereas under the
new standard, if the practice raised a substantial risk of falsity, the confession
would be inadmissible.18 5
The protection offered by this new standard is strengthened by relatively
recent procedural developments regarding the motion to suppress ixvoluntary
confessions. Under prior law, a suppression hearing could be held in front of
the jury, which often was required to decide the voluntariness issue. 186 Since
1965, however, the hearing must be held out of the jury's presence, 187 and the
judge must suppress the confession if not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of its voluntariness. 18 8 Even if the judge finds the confession voluntary,
the defendant, by raising the issue again at trial, is entitled to have the jury
instructed to disregard the confession upon their finding it was involuntarily
made.18 9 These developments provide substantial new protection to defen-
dants against the use of statements obtained by coercive police practices.
183. Id. § 60.45(2)(b).
184. The exclusion of statements obtained by methods creating a substantial risk of falsity
"works some change in the New York law of this area, although precisely what the law has been
is far from clear." Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.45, at 261
(McKinney 1971).
185. Id.
186. A suppression hearing was properly held before a jury. People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y.
147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909). If the evidence established that the confession was involuntary as a
matter of law, or if a finding of voluntariness would be against the weight of the evidence, the
trial judge excluded it. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 362, 98 N.E.2d 553, 558 (1951). When,
however, a question of fact as to voluntariness was presented, the confession was admitted and
the jury was instructed to disregard it if not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of its
voluntariness. See People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 416-17, 159 N.E. 379, 381-82 (1927).
187. The prior New York procedure for determining voluntariness was found to violate due
process in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), because the jury could not be expected to
ignore the appearance of reliability of a confession in determining whether it was voluntary. New
York complied with this decision by structuring a new procedure, which requires the judge to
make an initial determination of voluntariness. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d
179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965). The pretrial suppression hearing is called a "Huntley hearing" in
New York and is provided for in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law art. 710 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977).
188. The standard in New York is higher than the preponderance standard mandated under
the U.S. Constitution, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), arguably making the need for
corroboration less supportable.
189. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(3) (McKinney 1971). This is the so-called "Massachu-
setts procedure." See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 n.8 (1963). Massachusetts, the only
state which refused to adopt a corroboration rule, appeared to rely on the above procedure as a
better functional alternative for reducing the impact of involuntary confessions that were
unreliable.
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Furthermore, the protection of Miranda, Escobedo, 190 and various New York
state constitutional doctrines 91 go beyond the reliability issue to confront
directly the question of "unfairness" without regard to reliability.
The corroboration rule is apparently duplicative of the above doctrines, and
cannot be supported on the ground that it will prevent excessive use by the
police of involuntary confessions. 192 Since the "reappearing victim" rationale
is inapplicable to the corroboration of many crimes, and in any case has been
severely undercut by the acceptance of circumstantial corroboration of mini-
mal weight, 193 there remains only one possible rationale for corroboration: the
possible conviction of a defendant on the basis of a statement which is
unreliable, not because it was induced by official promises or tricks, but
because it was the product of a mental defect, delusion, mistake of law or
fact, or a poorly conceived attempt by the defendant to exculpate himself.
A case which illustrates the current approach of the New York courts to the
above situations is People v. Brown, 1 94 where the defendant sought to exclude
several inculpatory statements made to police and others on the ground that
the statements were not the product of "a rational intellect and a free will,"1 s
but were caused by a delusional belief that she and her children were in
danger. 196 The court held a suppression hearing and, using expert psychiatric
testimony introduced at a prior competency hearing, held the statements
admissible. The court based its conclusion on evidence that at the time
defendant made the statements she had testimonial capacity, appeared alert
and responsive to others, and that the statements themselves were logical,
coherent, and sufficiently detailed to indicate an origin in memory.1 97 The
court thus adopted a minimal standard for admissibility-the accused must be
competent at the time of confessing, that is, possess at that time the ability to
perceive, recall, and relate. 198 The "rational intellect", the court decided, is
190. See note 28 supra.
191. Such doctrines include the Donovan-Arthur rule, which renders inadmissable certain
statements made by defendants in police custody when they are denied access to an attorney, see
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), or when an
attorney demands and is denied access to the defendant, see People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325,
239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968). See J. Prince, Richardson on Evidence, §§ 547-49
(10th ed. 1973).
192. See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text; California's Corpus Delicti Rule, supra
note 15, at 1089-90.
193. See note 49 supra.
194. 86 Misc. 2d 339, 380 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Nassau County Ct. 1975).
195. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).
196. 86 Misc. 2d at 344, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 482. Defendant argued that the statements she had
made to police and reporters were involuntary under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.45(2)(a)
(McKinney 1971). However, it is questionable whether that section applies to confessions made in
response to some internal, rather than external, stimulus, since it requires "threatened use of
physical force ... or ...any other improper conduct or undue pressure". Id.
197. 86 Misc. 2d at 352, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Britt v. Common-
wealth, 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1974).
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really no more than a mere "modicum of intelligence." 99 This standard fails
to recognize a confession as any more inherently unreliable than any in-court
testimony. It further appears to bootstrap the conclusion of reliability on the
statement's internal appearance of logic, coherence, and detail. 200
It therefore appears that the existing law, considered apart from any
corroboration rule, does not fully safeguard the defendant from the introduc-
tion into evidence of an unreliable confession. The corroboration rule is
supposed to provide some additional safeguard against the defendant's convic-
tion on the basis of such a confession alone. The greatest danger of this type
of conviction arises when the confession appears reliable with respect to most
of the facts within it, but contains a key fact, necessary for the establishment
of a material element of the offense, which the defendant can show is
unreliable. 20 1 Under such circumstances the jury may convict on the basis
that the fact is proved by the defendant's own words, letting the reliability of
the rest of the statement infuse the questionable fact with credibility. A rule is
needed which will allow the trial judge in this situation to determine whether
the material element, and consequently the offense, is sufficiently proved.
B. The Proposed Rule
The present New York corpus delicti version corroboration rule should be
repealed and replaced by a rule that is specifically directed toward the
prevention of convictions on the sole basis of unreliable facts contained in a
confession or admission of the accused. It is suggested that the following rule
will achieve such an objective:
Statements of facts contained in a confession or in admissions of the defendant may be
used in determining legal sufficiency unless defendant shows, on grounds other than
those in § 60.45(2)(b)(i), that such facts are untrustworthy and the people fail to prove
such facts true by a preponderance of the evidence. 202
199. The court compared the standard to that for capacity to stand trial. 86 Misc. 2d at 350,
380 N.Y.S.2d at 487. It further argued that it would be difficult, if not inappropriate, for a judge
to determine whether a confession is a product of "free will" according to any less objective a
standard, since confessions are often prompted by complex emotional, moral, and ethical urgings.
Id. at 349-51, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88. Other courts, however, have attempted to apply
a less mechanical rule. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 459 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); People v.
MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
200. 86 Misc. 2d at 352, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (citing People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300,
307, 226 N.E.2d 305, 309, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 520, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967)).
201. In fact, the Brown opinion cites the current corroboration rule as an indication that the
use of a minimal test for admissability will not result in a breach of fairness towards the
defendant. 86 Misc. 2d at 348, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 486. Most confession doctrines deal with the
admissibility of the confession in its entirety. Although it is possible to expunge matter from a
confession on grounds of possible prejudice, this is not generally done on grounds of untrustwor-
thiness. See J. Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 552 (10th ed. 1973).
202. This rule would replace the current rule as § 60.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law. A
companion rule, set out in note 217 infra, specifies the procedural interrelationship of the
proposed rule to the other sections of the law.
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This rule rejects the corpus delicti construction in favor of a direct probing of
reliability. The rule's basic premise is that any fact in a confession or
admission which is used to establish any element of the offense charged may
be highly unreliable20 3 but may not fall within the criteria established by
other doctrines for exclusion from evidence. Where an element of the offense
is proved primarily through such stated facts, and where the other evidence
independently fails to rise to prima fade proof, the proposed rule allows the
trial judge an opportunity to delve further into the reliability of such facts.
Thus, the rule provides what one commentator has suggested may be the only
purpose for corroboration, a "more thorough review of the evidence to
determine whether, in view of any factors that might tend to show the
unreliability of the statements, the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain
the verdict. ' ' 2° 4 By focusing on reliability, the rule will insure that the trial
record fully and accurately reflects the primary concern of the corroboration
rule; an appellate court will then be in a position to analyze the judgment
below. 20 5 By discarding the corpus delicti framework, the rule adopts the
simplicity and logical consistency of the trustworthiness version-for example,
since any fact may conceivably be shown to be unreliable, the rule demands
that each and every element of the offense be proved by either extensive
external evidence or by reliable facts in a confession. 20 6
The major innovation of the proposed rule is its shift to the defendant of
the burden of going forward. It will be remembered that the corroboration
requirement traditionally has been construed weakly; the logical "each and
every element" rule has been rejected by almost all jurisdictions as too
203. Thus, such elements of crimes as the felony in felony murder, intent in intentional
murder, and time of day in second degree burglary may all require corroboration if they are
proved substantially through the defendant's statement and the defendant can raise a reasonable
doubt as to the reliability of the facts as he has stated them. Even the defendant's identity should
come within the ambit of the rule, for it is no less amenable to untrustworthiness than any other
aspect of the prosecution's case. For example, if defendant testifies at trial that he confessed to
prevent his mother, who really committed the crime, from going to jail, there is no reason not to
test the reliability of the identity.
204. C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 158, at 349.
205. The appellate court will not have to resort to arcane rules as has been necessary under
the current rule. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
206. A benefit of the proposed rule is that it should encourage careful police investigatory
work because the accused may put any part of his confession to the test. The result is that
conclusory and undetailed confessions will prove difficult to use as a basis for conviction. For
example, suppose that the police secure a confession which reads in its entirety, "I killed V last
night. I shot him with my gun," and that this is the only evidence which the prosecution intends
to present on a charge of intentional murder. If defendant can show that he accidentally fired his
gun, saw V fall, and ran, he can challenge the prosecution's evidence with respect to two material
elements, intent and death. The prosecution will have to prove by a preponderance as a threshold
to get to the jury that V is dead or that 1's death was reasonably within defendant's knowledge,
and that V's death was intentionally caused. It is apparent that such proof cannot be succesful
without significant external evidence. The proposed rule thus still protects against the wholesale
proof of a case by an extrajudicial confession, an objective of the corroboration rule since its
adoption. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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burdensome for the prosecutor. 20 7 The prosecutor already has substantial
burdens with respect to custodial statements and statements claimed by the
defendant to be otherwise involuntary. 208 The proposed rule effects a com-
promise, and does so in a more rational way than does the corpus delicti
version . 209 The rule simply requires the defendant to come forward with facts
to support his contention of untrustworthiness. 2 10 Unless the defendant does
so, once the confession is admitted its entire contents are presumed sufficiently
reliable for the jury's consideration. 2 1' Thus, the prosecutor need not produce
impossible-to-find corroboration. The defendant must first make a reasonable
showing that the contested facts are untrue. 21 2 Upon this showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor, who may establish the facts as reliable by offering
circumstantial or direct evidence of the facts at issue, or by attacking the
credibility of the defendant's claim. The burden of proof is placed upon the
prosecutor; he must convince the judge by a preponderance of the evidence,
or else the admitted facts may not be used to determine whether a prima facie
case exists. The preponderance standard is another compromise-less than
that used to determine voluntariness, but greater than the slight weight used
under the existing corroboration rule.2 13
People v. Murray provides a situation which illustrates the rule's function-
ing. 214 Assume the defendant, in trying to suppress the confession, had not
attacked it on grounds that the police methods used tended to induce a false
confession. The defendant thus would have the opportunity to raise indepen-
dently the issue of the reliability of the admission of attempted robbery
contained in the confession. Defendant would testify that he fabricated his
confession to the attempted robbery because he felt at the time that this
confession would be less harmful than a statement that the man he killed was
207. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 187-88 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text.
210. This approach follows the lines recommended by Professor Dix in his analysis of
problems of mistake or ignorance of the defendant when he waives his rights to remain silent and
to the presence of counsel. As an "accommodation" to the burdened prosecutor, he suggests the
defendant can challenge a waiver only by meeting an initial burden of production. Dix, supra,
note 27, at 346-51. Likewise, with respect to questions of reliability, the defendant is in a better
position than the prosecutor to produce evidence as to why his statement is untrustworthy.
211. If the defendant has challenged the admissibility of the confession, he may have raised
the issue of reliability by claiming that his statement was induced by methods which created a
substantial risk of falsity. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.45(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1971). The admission
of the statement consequently establishes it as free from a substantial risk of unreliability. With
the exception of the defendant's subsequent discovery of new evidence, see id. § 710.40(4), there
is no reason to let the issue be relitigated. A new procedural statute is suggested in note 217 iqfra
detailing how duplicative hearings may be avoided.
212. The rule avoids "corroboration" per se. The onl) corroboration in the traditional corpus
delicti sense is that the rule does not come into issue if the prosecution introduces legally sufficient
evidence, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 70.10(1) (McKinney 1971), independent of the confession.
213. See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
214. 40 N.Y.2d 327, 353 N.E.2d 605, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948
(1977); see notes 158-75 supra and accompanying text.
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his drug supplier. Perhaps defendant could find other witnesses who could
attest to his drug use. In any event, if the defendant makes a credible showing
that the facts were fabricated, the presumption of reliability is rebutted and
the burden falls on the prosecution to prove them true. The prosecution can
rebut the defendant in several ways: it can show that the victim was not a
drug pusher, or that the defendant did not know the victim, or that the
defendant was not an addict, or that the defendant was aware when he
confessed that the police knew he was an addict, or even that the circum-
stances surrounding the event made the defendant's new story more question-
able than his first story. Before charging the jury, the judge would rule on the
sufficiency of the evidence and would not charge felony murder unless the
prosecution had met its burden of proof. The appellate courts would receive a
record which delineated the grounds upon which the decision was made. No
mention would be made of the esoteric issue of whether the corroboration of
felony murder must include corroboration of the underlying felony.
As another example, consider cases such as People v. Brown,21 where a
defendant claims his out-of-court statement is unreliable because it was made
while he was under a severe state of stress or some other diminished mental
condition. Under the proposed rule, the defendant could meet his burden of
production by introducing expert psychiatric testimony, and the prosecutor no
doubt would counter with the same. The rule has advantages over the current
admissibility hearing in at least two respects. First, since the rule looks to
sufficiency rather than admissibility, the judge will have the entire record
before him in reaching his decision. Second, because the rule clearly applies a
reliability, rather than a voluntariness, standard it avoids the implications of
the less objective standard rejected by the Brown court.2 6 The rule does not
require the judge to analyze the defendant's motivation in confessing to
determine whether it was in accordance with the concept of "free will." The
judge must merely rule on reliability.
An important aspect of the proposed rule is the procedural context into
which it must fit. Since the rule relates closely to other confession doctrines,
but involves sufficiency rather than admissibility, and is reasonably compli-
cated in that it sets forth burdens of producing evidence, a procedural statute,
an example of which is set forth in the margin, 217 would be helpful to
215. 86 Alisc. 2d 339, 380 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Nassau County Ct. 1975); see notes 194-201 supra
and accompanying text.
216. See note 199 supra.
217. Procedure for raising and determining sufficiency of proof under § 60.50.
(1) If the people notify defendant of intention to offer evidence of a statement made by
defendant, pursuant to § 710.30(1)(a), and if defendant moves to suppress such evidence before
trial, pursuant to § 710.40, defendant waives any further defense as to legal insufficiency under §
60.50 [the proposed rule] unless he raises, in his motion papers or at a hearing on the motion to
suppress, the evidence required of him under § 60.50, or unless circumstances set forth in §
710.40(4) subsequently develop.
(2) If the defendant is not notified according to subd. 1, he may at any time prior to the
charging of the jury move for a hearing to determine the sufficiency of proof under § 60.50.
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eliminate forseeable complications. The first criterion must be to conserve
court resources within the spirit of the rule. Since most defendants will seek to
suppress a confession in a hearing, they should be required to raise the
reliability issue at the same time.2 1 8 Besides avoiding multiple hearings, this
affords the prosecution a chance to gather evidence to rebut the defendant's
claim. If the defendant does not contest the admissibility of the admission or
confession (possibly because he need not be given notice that certain of his
statements will be used),2 1 9 he will first raise the issue when presented with
the statement at trial. Defendant must be given a chance to make his showing
at trial or at a hearing during trial, at the close of the people's case. 2 0 Such a
hearing should be held out of the jury's presence, if the defendant chooses. 2 2'
Thus, the defendant should be given an opportunity to decide whether to
make the issue a part of his defense since it is recognized that under some
circumstances the collateral proof may be prejudicial, involving as in the
Murray case, admissions of criminal activities. This rule also allows the
defendant to challenge the reliability of facts contained within his extra-
judicial statement without having to forego his right not to testify at his trial.
In sum, the new corroboration rule should be introduced within the context of
existing New York procedural law in such a way as to avoid compromising
the policy objectives on which it is based.
V. CONCLUSION
The confession corroboration requirement is one of the oldest evidentiary
rules in New York criminal law. Although the stated reason for the rule is the
prevention of convictions for crimes which have not been committed, an
analysis of the case law shows that the rule has historically been used to
prevent convictions based largely on unreliable confessions. However, the
rule is not well suited to this purpose because of limitations inherent in the
concept of corpus delicti on which it is based. Three problems have resulted:
there has been a promulgation of confusing rules of construction that have
questionable links to the issue of reliability; cases which reach reasonable
(3) If either the people or the defendant have evidence to introduce with respect to the
issue of sufficiency under § 60.50, the court must hold a hearing prior to charging the jury. The
hearing must be held out of the jury's presence at the defendant's discretion. The court may use
all evidence presented at the hearing and at the trial in reaching its determination. The court
must set down its findings and the reasons therefor.
The above procedure [hereinafter cited as New procedure] refers to sections of the N.Y. Criminal
Procedure Law (McKinney 1971).
218. Under current law, the prosecutor must notify the defendant if he intends to use In
evidence a statement made by the defendant to a public servant. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
710.30(1) (McKinney 1971). The defendant may then file a motion to suppress. See id. § 710.40.
219. Admissions made to private parties, for example, may be used without notice to
defendant. He still has a chance under the new procedure to contest the reliability of the
admission at any time prior to the judge's charge.
220. New procedure, supra note 217, subd. 2.
221. New procedure, supra note 217, subd. 3.
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results must do so through circuitous logic; and there are some cases in which
the rule cannot be used to test the reliability of the confession. The corrobora-
tion rule originated in a complex of policy rationales. Because of the many
recent developments in confession law the only remaining rationale is the
prevention of convictions based on unreliable facts contained within an oth-
erwise voluntary extra-judicial statement. The trustworthiness version of
corroboration, used in the federal courts and an increasing number of states,
directly relates to this rationale. New York should adopt this rule, tailoring it
to the context of existing evidentiary and procedural law. A suggested draft of
such a rule has been presented which, it is submitted, represents a workable
and rational approach to confession corroboration in a post-Miranda era.
Julian S. Millstein
